In the study of environmental protection issues for more than forty years, research on the impact of financial performance on environmental protection has been one of the important branches. In the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper explores the opportunism motives in a company's environmental protection activism and the moderating role of corporate governance using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2016. The study finds that: (1) the company's environmental protection activism is driven by the opportunist motives of policymakers who want to mask their inability; and (2) environmental protection activism does not enhance the company's future performance and value creation capability. Further studies find that corporate governance mechanisms play different moderating roles. Fund Shareholders play a positive governance role and reduce the correlation between financial performance and environmental protection activism. However, independence of the board of directors intensifies the opportunist motives. This paper provides new theoretical explanations for environmental protection decision-making, provides novel enlightenment for the protection of environmental protection policies in developing countries and regions. © 2018 by the author.
