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
Mountain Population and Employment

Discussion Paper Series

MPE Series No 11

April 1990

International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development



**ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATIONS AND THE IMPACT ON
RESOURCE UTILISATION IN THE PAK-GERMAN
SELF-HELP PROJECT AREA, BALUCHISTAN**

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MPE Series No. 11

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April 1990

International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)
Kathmandu, Nepal

FOREWORD

The discussion paper presented here by Dr. Saifur Rahman Sherani and colleagues, entitled "Organisational Innovations and the Impact on Resource Utilisation in the Pak-German Self-Help Project Area, Baluchistan," constitutes one of six case studies initiated by ICIMOD in conjunction with the Programme on Organisation and Management of Rural Development.

This programme focused primarily on the organisational resources and their relationship to the management of natural resources for sustainable development and increased productivity in mountainous areas. Across the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Mountains, rural development projects are relying on different strategies for the achievement of the above goal. These strategies are being implemented within a given macro-institutional and legal framework; presumably with adequate attention given to the sociocultural context. The framework and the context limit, as well as offer, possibilities to development agencies. The purpose of the case studies was to examine innovative institutional strategies implemented in projects (carried out by governmental agencies or nongovernmental organisations) and also to analyse and assess the utility and effectiveness of indigenous resource management systems.

I would like to thank the Aga Khan Foundation for the partial financial support in running the programme. I am also grateful for the assistance we received from the Nepal-Australia Forestry Project, the Dhading District Development Project, the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme and the Pak-German Self Help Project. The programme execution from ICIMOD's side was carried out by Dr. Anis Dani (now with AKRSP) and Dr. Deepak Bajracharya.

ICIMOD was also fortunate to have engaged in collaboration with professionals from various national institutions and project implementing agencies in China, Nepal, and Pakistan. Mutual consultations were held at various planning workshops and orientation sessions in Kathmandu and at the project sites. The participating researchers eventually agreed on the methodological framework and the set of questions that they would try to address. Sufficient flexibility was left, so that, at the discretion of researchers, responses could be made to site-specific situations.

Research Methods. A combination of techniques was used during the course of the research that lasted between six months to one year.

- o Collation and analysis of existing data from government and project records.
- o Selected open-ended interviews with relevant government officials, project personnel, and key resource persons from the region.
- o Field investigations in 8-12 villages within each project area, selected purposively to cover the various strata, the variable impact of development activities, and a range of resource management activities; rapid appraisal techniques were developed and each village was visited two or three times, altogether for about 7 days, to obtain details of specific components after preparation of an initial village profile.
- o Participant observation of project activities.

The **key questions** that the researchers were trying to address included the following:

- o Under what circumstances do existing resource management systems undergo institutional innovations?
- o What elements of existing resource management systems can intervening agencies build on: tenurial arrangements? property relationships? organizational structures? functionaries?
- o How do different kinds of interventions compare in terms of their ability to generate sustainable development and sound environmental management?
- o How does the user group internalize the benefits and costs of using the resource? How are risks shared? If benefits are not equally distributed, how are the losers compensated?
- o How does the user group ration a scarce resource?
- o How does the user group respond to development opportunities and entrepreneurial endeavours?

Influencing Factors. In addition, the following set of questions, which emerged from the reviews and research already conducted by ICIMOD, were also proposed for investigation during the course of the study:

- o Is the propensity of user investment in future returns related to the resource value, i.e., to the perceived value of the resource?
- o Does the tenurial security of the resource to the user influence the time horizon of local resource management?
- o If actual users have more responsibility for management decisions over their resources, are the resources more likely to be managed for long-term productivity at less cost to the supporting agencies?
- o Does increased equity in distribution of resource benefits encourage greater participation by user groups?
- o Will a resource management function be performed more efficiently if the performer is accountable to the local user group?

Women's Role in Resource Management. A third set of key questions, which appear to be of critical importance, deals with the role of women in resource management. These are:

- o What role do women have in resource management?
- o Is the role of women of particular importance in the use of certain resources, e.g., forests, grasslands, and water? If so, do they have any role in decision-making about, and the management of, those resources?
- o What are the constraints on women's involvement in resource management?
- o How do women perceive their own role in regard to resource management? How do they feel their participation can be improved ?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to ICIMOD for sponsoring the study and to the Pak-German Self Help Project, LGD/GTZ, for co-sponsoring the study and collaborating in its implementation.

I would like to thank Mr. Christoph Feyen for his support. He provided invaluable information about the Project without which this study would not have been possible. I am grateful to Mrs. Ute Hubner for information about the Women's Section activities and programmes in different villages. I deeply appreciate the Support of the Project Coordinator Martin Huebner, Christoph Feyen, and Dr. Anis Dani, now with AKRSP but Coordinator of the OMRD Programme at ICIMOD until June 1989. They read the earlier drafts of the report and made valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Mr. Nayyar Iqbal and Mr. Edward Arthur, of the Social Development Section, who furnished a great deal of information about project activities in various villages. Mr. Karim Nawaz and Mr. Hafeez Buzdar assisted in data collection, field visits, and in preparation of village profiles. Mrs. Rosemary Gunter provided support services and typed the tables.

Dr. Ram P. Yadav (Deputy Director) and Dr. Deepak Bajracharya (Division Head), as well as the editorial staff at ICIMOD, made suggestions on the final text and I sincerely thank them for their unfailing interest. Finally, my heartfelt gratitude is due to the LGD field staff, project staff, villagers without whose cooperation the work could not have been completed within the short time span of four months.

Saifur Rahman Sherani

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BACKGROUND ON BALUCHISTAN

Introduction

This study analyses the process of rural development in Baluchistan in the context of the Pak-German Self-Help Project. The study was commissioned by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) with the purpose of examining the impact of rural development programmes on sustainable resource management. ICIMOD is particularly interested in exploring aspects of resource management systems and community organisation.

Most rural development programmes in the region are linked to the elected local government institutions. Emphasis is on community participation in identifying problems and proposing solutions to them. The objectives of these programmes are concerned with building and strengthening village institutions and popular participation at the grass roots' level so that, with external assistance, local resources can be better used and sustained. Communities are encouraged to identify, plan, and implement schemes to tackle their problems.

In order to facilitate this approach of development from below, appropriate institutions need to be mobilised and programmes established based upon sound environmental management and efficient use of local resources with the long term aim of improving the quality of life in rural areas. Accordingly, it is essential to examine the objectives of rural development projects, their implementation, intervention, and impacts at the village level; especially in respect of resource management systems.

These questions are of special importance to the Pak-German Self-Help Project (henceforth called the Project). The basic objective of the Project is to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the rural poor in selected union councils of Baluchistan by better use of local resources. The Project tries to develop self-help potentials in order to enable villagers to identify their problems and solve them through community action. The Project recognises that development which can be accomplished with the participation of the community, and its various social and economic interest groups, can be sustainable. To facilitate popular participation in the development process, the Project pursues the strategy of self-help to mobilise resources within the society, and organises village-level self-help groups as a foundation for self-sustained development activities leading to self-reliance.

In Baluchistan, prime importance is given to the fulfillment of basic needs such as food and shelter. Previous development programmes, implemented by the Government, attempted to improve the quality of life in rural areas, but they were unable to reach the rural poor in Baluchistan to any significant degree. Their effectiveness was hampered by centralisation, by tight bureaucratic controls, and by their inability to alter the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of rural society.

In view of all these past experiences, the Project tried to establish a broad-based self-help group in the villages, the Village Organisation (VO), as an institution providing an independent forum for exchanging ideas about village problems and development prospects. With the cooperation and support of the Project, it is expected that the VOs should be able to improve the management of local resources to meet their basic needs and establish a basis for self-reliance.

The Study Area

The Province of Baluchistan, in southwestern Pakistan, is the largest province in the country, with a total area of 347,190 km² (43.6 per cent of the total area). It is the least populated province, with 4.3 million inhabitants in 1981 (5.1 per cent of the national total). About 15 per cent of its population live in urban areas, mainly in Quetta city, and 85 per cent live in 6,111 villages, of which only 57 villages have a population of over 5,000. Most of the villages (84 per cent) have a population of less than 1,000. The overall density of the population is 12.5/km². A large number of extremely small villages are scattered throughout the vast desert and mountainous area (See Table 1). The difficulty of the terrain and the scattered settlement pattern make the development and maintenance of communication, infrastructure, and social services extremely difficult and expensive.

Baluchistan, is bordered by the Province of Sindh in the east, the Punjab in the northeast, the North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan in the north, Iran in the west, and the Persian Gulf in the south. There are considerable variations in topography, soil, and climate among different regions of the province. A large proportion of the area consists of barren and craggy mountains of up to 3,500m, contrasted with deserts and plains that lie under 100m. There are also wide variations in climatic conditions, precipitation, and temperature throughout the different areas. The plains and deserts of Baluchistan are the hottest areas of Pakistan with midsummer mean maximum temperatures above 40°C, while the high altitude areas are temperate in summer and severely cold in winter with sub-zero temperatures. Rainfall varies widely from year to year and area to area but the average annual rainfall is in the range of 1200-2000 mm.

Table 1: Basic Statistics of Baluchistan

Total Area	34.71	million hectare
Total Forest Area	1.08	million hectare
Total Cultivated Area	1.34	million hectare
Total Population	4.33	million (1981)
Average Annual Growth Rate	7.1	per cent (1981)
Literacy Rate	10.3	per cent (1981)
Rural Population	84.6	per cent (1981)
Total Number of Villages	6,111	
Average Population per Village	598	persons
School Enrollment Rate ^a (Both sexes)	3.8	per cent
Female Enrollment Rate ^a	0.8	per cent

Note:

a. Percentage of students in the 5 - 24 years age group.

Different climatic conditions in different parts of Baluchistan allow for diverse cropping patterns. A large number of vegetables, fruits, and spices, of both tropical and temperate zones, are grown in different regions. Although increasing gradually, the area under cultivation is extremely small. Out of a total of 34.7 million hectares of land, 1.34 million hectares (3.3 million acres) are cultivated. Of this, only 0.32 million hectares (0.8 million acres) are irrigated. Settled agriculture is limited. Most of the rural people are engaged in raising sheep and goats. About 70 per cent of the rural population are pastoralists and live a semi-nomadic life.

Baluchistan has experienced rapid changes in the past two decades. Agricultural development, due to increased irrigation and other components of the green revolution, is taking place throughout the Province. Between 1974-75 and 1984-85, the total cultivated area increased from 337,674 to 605,167 hectares, the total number of tubewells increased from 4335 to 8068, the total number of tractors increased from 696 to 3141, and the total credit disbursed for agriculture increased from Rs 15.72 million to Rs 134 million. Investment in agriculture by government and international agencies, as well as the private sector, has produced a rapid increase in productivity and brought broad social and economic changes. Some benefits of the green revolution have also accrued to small farmers. Tractors are hired and tubewell water is bought by them. Thus, the impact of modern technology is fairly widespread. This distribution has some impact on income distribution in rural areas. The agrarian structure has changed and common property rights have given way to the private ownership of land and pastureland. Markets are penetrating the subsistence economy and agricultural production is now more oriented to market signals.

The land tenure system in Baluchistan varies from area to area and from tribe to tribe. According to revenue records, most of Baluchistan remains unsurveyed and unsettled. Data from the Agricultural Census of 1980 record that 33 per cent of landowners possess under five acres each and this accounts for only three per cent of the total area. Similarly, another 33 per cent of landowners own between five and 12.5 acres, and this accounts for 14 per cent of the total area. In sharp contrast to this, 55 per cent of the total area is owned by only nine per cent of the landlords, in holdings of over 50 acres (see Table 2). A vast majority of the large landholdings are cultivated by tenants. Different classifications of tenant, viz., *tabay marzi* (tenant at will), *maoroosi* (occupancy tenant), and *lath bana* (land developer tenants; compensated for the labour if ejected) are applied to various classes of tenants. In practice, security of tenure is in the hands of the landlord. The tenancy system, organisation of production, and crop sharing arrangements vary from area to area, depending upon the availability of irrigation water and the labour needed for different types of crops. Tenants are mostly landless labourers or landowners with very small landholdings (Government of Baluchistan 1986, Government of Pakistan 1983, and UNICEF 1980).

The life of a tenant is characterised by poverty and very hard work under extremely harsh climatic conditions. According to the sources cited above, 40 per cent of the tenant households and 41 per cent of the owner-cum-tenant households are in debt. Financial institutions and banks are beyond their reach. They are to some extent unaware of, and unable to secure, loans from credit institutions because they cannot offer any collateral acceptable to the bank. Their credit needs are fulfilled by the Hindu *baniya*, moneylender-cum-shopkeeper; who often lends on personal security or on the credit-worthiness of the customer and his own capability to recover the loan. The *baniya* charges ten per cent interest per month on loans that are mostly secured to purchase seeds at the time of sowing. The moneylender recovers his loan at harvest time when he arrives with his empty bags and clears the debt as well as the farmer's produce. Very little is left after repayment of the loan, and the farmer is forced to borrow again for his consumption. He rarely becomes free from grinding debt.

An average household owns several goats or sheep and about a dozen or so chickens. Only a small number of households own cattle. The per capita income of the rural household was estimated to be \$72 per annum in 1986 (equal to Rs 1,300), whereas the income of town dwellers is almost double this amount (Government of Baluchistan 1986). Estimates of household income

Table 2: Distribution of Land Holdings

Size of Holdings (Acres)	Holdings		Area in Acres	
	No.	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
< 1.0	5,962	3	2,237	Neg ^a
1.0 - 2.5	30,851	17	47,886	1
2.5 - 5.0	23,892	13	84,325	2
5.0 - 7.5	23,956	13	1,355,614	4
7.5 - 12.5	36,755	20	366,551	10
12.5 - 25.0	29,263	16	525,527	14
25.0 - 50.0	16,830	9	555,239	14
50.0 - 150.0	12,670	7	931,386	24
> 150.0	3,439	2	1,183,814	31
Total	183,618	100	3,832,529	100

Note:

a. "Neg" = Negligible

Source : Government of Pakistan (1983, 394)

in rural areas are very difficult to obtain due to: (1) plurality of small sources and (2) inability of villagers to count and assess all their minor sources of income. To overcome these limitations, Sherani and Iqbal prepared estimates of household expenditure based on the entire consumption pattern of an average tenant household throughout the year. According to these estimates, per capita expenditure in Jalal Khan Union Council, in Kachhi district was Rs 2,776 or \$ 154 per annum (Sherani and Iqbal 1989, 12).

Sociocultural Features

Ethnically, the Province is the most heterogeneous in Pakistan. There are three major groups, the *Baluchis* (36 per cent), the *Brohis* (21 per cent), and the *Pathans* (25 per cent). Politicians and intellectuals of both the *Baluch* and *Brohi* groups claim a common origin and ethnicity for both groups and often subsume *Brohis* in the *Baluch*. This is largely due to political exigencies, as *Brohis* are linguistically a separate group. In fact, they are the only Dravidian language community in Pakistan. The remaining 18 per cent include different ethnic groups: *Hindu*, *Punjabi*, *Muhajir*, *Parsi*, *Hazara*, and many other small and diverse groups. In the past decade, the *Hazaras*, from both Iran and Afghanistan, and some Afghan refugees have managed to settle permanently with the help of tribal friends and relatives.

In rural Baluchistan, the two major ethnic groups tend to have geographically defined boundaries. They interact mostly in the provincial capital, Quetta, and in some other small towns. Several languages and many dialects are spoken in Baluchistan, and a large number of men are polyglot. *Pushto* and different dialects of *Baluchi*, *Brohi*, *Saraiki*, and *Sindhi* are spoken in different rural areas where only a minority can communicate in *Urdu*; the national language of Pakistan. In addition to the languages mentioned above, *Urdu*, *Punjabi*, and *Farsi* are the first languages of some groups in Quetta and some of the other towns.

The social organisation of Baluchistan is tribal and the tribe is basically a political unit. Most tribes in Baluchistan inhabit a well-defined geographical territory. Tribal leaders lay claim to all resources in the area occupied by their tribes. The once decaying tribal system was strengthened by the colonial power in the late nineteenth century with the introduction of indirect rule. Under indirect rule, tribal chiefs were made responsible for the maintenance of law and order and were invested with judicial powers, provided with a tribal levy force, and allowed to maintain penal institutions. With state-sponsored judicial authority for tribal chiefs, tribesmen were converted into their subjects. The power of the State was reinforced by the customs and conventions of the tribe, as well as by the kinship organisation. This ensured the loyal support of tribal people towards their chiefs.

The legal foundation of this tribal system was abolished by the Government of Pakistan in 1976. In practice, the tribal system still persists through kinship organisation. Because of the tribal system, land remained unsurveyed and unsettled in most parts of Baluchistan. Successive land reforms have not altered the ownership structure in any fundamental manner. Development programmes, initiated by various agencies of the Government, have created competition for resources among different groups. To some extent, this has led to the resurrection of traditional bonds of solidarity and strengthened the tribal social organisation.

Urbanisation, due to migration of the rural population since the early 1970's, led to the de-tribalisation of immigrants. On the other hand, in urban areas, competition for admission to educational institutions and jobs led to the creation of relatively broad-based ethnic group organisations. In many cases, the literate tribal people have established formal organisations in towns to deal with the problems faced by members of particular tribes. Tribal chiefs have emerged as leaders of these organisations because of their ability to influence the political system. As a result the power of tribal chiefs is weakened in some areas but strengthened in other respects.

Quetta, the provincial capital and the only large town, is dominated by diverse groups of migrants from different parts of Pakistan and from Iran and Afghanistan. The 560 km (350 mile) long southern coast-line of Baluchistan, from Gwader to Karachi, has several large-scale fishing and ship-breaking industries run exclusively by the capitalists of Karachi. The Province is endowed with mineral resources: coal, gas, barites, chromite, and iron ore. Mineral deposits of copper and other metals are reported but their potential, quantity, and quality have not been firmly assessed. Mining is carried out in both the private and public sectors and mine owners come from different ethnic groups. Local people rarely work in the mines. For example, in the coal-mines most of the workers are recruited from Swat and Kashmir (Ahmed 1975, Government of Baluchistan 1986).

Sex segregation is practised from adolescence. Social contact of male and female is not permitted by custom. Despite this, females are engaged in all sorts of agricultural and nomadic pastoral activities. It is generally the responsibility of women to fetch water from distant places, look after the animals and participate fully in harvesting crops. Women have a very limited role in decision making and in the management of resources. Land and property rights are strictly vested in

men. In some areas, women produce embroidered garments and hats which are exchanged by men in the local market for household necessities.

Usually, girls are married at puberty. Marriage customs and practices vary from area to area and from tribe to tribe. Marriages are either by bride exchange or bride price, variously known as *lab* or *valver*. Malnutrition, high morbidity rates, and a very high rate of infant mortality (ranging from 130-240 per thousand) have been reported by different sources. Traditional practices concerning pregnancy and child bearing are also hazardous and cause major illnesses, still births, and abortions. About 41 per cent of births are either self-administered or attended on by family members, and 50 per cent of births are attended on by a traditional midwife or *dai*.

In Pakistan, 30 per cent of all reported illnesses and 40 per cent of all deaths are caused by the use of contaminated water (Government of Pakistan 1983, 395-397). Scarcity of safe drinking water is a problem for a vast majority of the rural population in Baluchistan. In Pakistan, 22 per cent of the population have access to clean potable water but in Baluchistan only 10 per cent have piped water. In many areas, rain or flood water is stored in open-air ponds, and this water is consumed throughout the year by both men and beasts. Ponds are neither protected by a boundary wall nor is the water cleaned with chemicals or by other methods.

Development Assistance Programmes

The nomadic-pastoralist and limited agrarian economy of Baluchistan held little economic attraction for the colonial power. The British used Baluchistan to define and defend the western frontiers of their Indian Empire against the expansionist threat of other imperialist powers. The present western frontiers of Pakistan were created by the British in the late nineteenth century with the establishment of the Goldsmid Line, dividing Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, and the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two largest ethnic groups of Baluchistan, the *Baluchis* and the *Pathans*, are divided among these neighbouring countries. The *Baluchis* are divided among Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan; and the *Pathans* are divided among northern Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Afghanistan. These divisions have created irredentist nationalist movements, however mercurial, all along these frontiers. Any major political change anywhere along these frontiers is bound to affect adjacent areas on the other side of the border which are to some extent culturally and ethnically homogeneous.

The political instability in Afghanistan, since 1978, and the Islamic revolution in Iran, in early 1979, had brought some instability to Baluchistan. A large number of Afghan refugees came to Baluchistan and were accommodated in refugee camps. Some disruption in the Iranian *Sistan-i-Baluchistan*, in 1979-80, also stirred emotions, though to a limited extent. Baluchistan, having experienced various levels of instability in the past, was once again threatened with another period of instability (Harrison 1981, Lifschultz 1983, and Baluch 1983). With the Russian involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front-line State. In these circumstances, most of the friendly western Governments offered economic assistance to cope with the situation.

The entire region, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, experienced political crises of different intensities in the late 1970's. Baluchistan, having just recovered from political turmoil, gained importance overnight due to international geo-political concerns. Stability in Baluchistan was no longer the concern of only the Government of Pakistan. In this situation, many Governments and international agencies offered economic assistance for the development of Baluchistan.

Since the early 1980s, 26 international and bilateral development agencies have sponsored various projects for development in Baluchistan. Many types of development programmes, from provision of a natural gas pipeline to Quetta city to rural development and provision of basic

needs in small hamlets, were initiated. The sponsors included organisations within the UN system, development agencies of western Governments, and development funds from some of the Persian Gulf States. Of these, some of the significant projects are the UNICEF-sponsored, Baluchistan Integrated Area Development Programme (BIAD); the USAID-sponsored, Baluchistan Area Development (BALAD) programme; and irrigation and agricultural development programmes sponsored by UNDP, the World Bank, and the Kuwait Fund.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany offered economic assistance for several development activities in Baluchistan. These included funding for part of the Baluchistan Minor Irrigation and Agricultural Development (BMIAD), establishment of Technical Training Centres, and establishment of the Self-Help Fund for Rural Development in Baluchistan.

As all these development agencies offered economic assistance at the same time, the provincial government was unable to coordinate the different agencies and their programmes. The need for coordination is becoming more urgent but the issue has not as yet been resolved. The agencies involved in design and implementation of development programmes have also failed to liaise and coordinate among themselves. As a result, many of these programmes overlap considerably in their objectives and areas of operation. For example, the BMIAD, BALAD, BIAD, and the Pak-German Self Help Project have certain areas of common concern but their activities are not coordinated. Information does not flow from one to the other at any level either.

The Pak-German Self-Help Project has made efforts to bridge this information gap. In early 1989, the Project Coordinator wrote to all project heads in Baluchistan informing them about the activities of the Project in nine union councils of the Project Area and requesting similar information about their Projects. However, no responses have been received.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Pressure on Resources

Most people in rural Baluchistan are pastoralists and earn a substantial portion of their livelihood by raising small ruminants. Apart from large flock-owners, almost all rural households own at least a sheep or a goat. The total population of small ruminants has rapidly increased since the mid 1970s. For example, in 1960, the total number of small ruminants was 4.2 million, and this had increased to 7.1 million by 1972. Between 1976 and 1986, the numbers had almost doubled from 9.5 million to 18.4 million (Masood et al. 1988,90). At the same time, the human population has almost doubled (from 2.43 million in 1972 to 4.3 million in 1981) while the percentage of urban population, (in the same period) has increased from 10 per cent to 16 per cent. This has been concurrent with a significant change in the pattern of settlements and the abandonment of the traditional nomadic life-style which, in some cases, has been replaced by seasonal migration. This, in its turn, has led to the construction of new houses and the emergence of new settlements.

These population changes have exerted enormous pressure on resources and led to their rapid depletion. Forests have been felled to meet the insatiable demands for fuel-wood and timber, while Government afforestation programmes are of recent origin and of limited impact. According to official sources, 13,600 hectares were afforested between 1974 and 1986 (Masood et al. 1988, 1).

Ninety three per cent of the land area in Baluchistan is classified as pasture, and, according to one source, 60 per cent of this area is actively used for grazing (ICARDA 1987,8). Farmers complain about the scarcity of pasture for which they blame the lack of rain. However, exploitation of pastures and forests is so excessive that there is no opportunity for regeneration. The entire resource management system is under severe pressure. Administrative changes as well as changes in tenurial arrangements have also contributed to this scarcity (Buzdar 1987).

Indigenous Resource Management Systems

The tribal system carries with it a considerable degree of authoritarianism and hierarchy within the political unit of each tribe (which often occupies a specified geographic area). In theory, all resources in the area were the common property of the entire tribe. In practice, tribal leaders claimed ownership of the entire resource base, and, during the colonial period, other tribal members were relegated to subject status. Tribal chiefs were the landlords, and land was cultivated by tribesmen who paid taxes to their chiefs. These taxes, commonly known as *shishak* (literally one-sixth), were levied on all cultivators by their chiefs and ranged from one-sixth to one-half of the produce, depending on the classification of land and irrigation arrangements. Several classes of land, e.g. land for the tribal chief, for the household of the tribal chief, for his guests, for his retinue, and for different lineages and their heads, were recognised (Ahmad 1975). This system was endorsed by the State until 1976.

This land tenure system began to change gradually from the mid 1960s, with the creation of revenue records and land settlement in some areas. One important impact of the establishment of revenue records was the government's demand for land revenue. Tribesmen, who were able to

obtain titles to land in the revenue records, were subject to dual taxation; land revenue demanded by the State and *shishak* demanded by the tribal chiefs. These tax demands created conflicts between new, landowning tribesmen and tribal chiefs on the one hand, and between the tribes and the State on the other.

Under the indigenous system, where ownership was vested in the lineage, it was obligatory to pay *shishak* to the tribal chief, and management of land was the responsibility of the entire community. In a limited number of areas, where there was perennial irrigation, the community would decide whether to leave some of the land fallow and cultivate the remainder. Similarly, decisions regarding crop rotation were taken by the community. Both these institutions provided sustainable management of land and subsistence to the community with its optimum population level.

In flood-irrigated areas, maintenance and construction of irrigation dams and canals, construction of drainage canals, and protection from soil erosion were the responsibility of all cultivators. In the flood irrigated areas of Kachhi District, for example, the entire area was cultivated by tenants who were collectively responsible for carrying out maintenance works. Some coercion was also applied, where necessary, to ensure the completion of maintenance works. Gradually, settlement records have been completed and individual ownership of land established. Management of land, in respect to measures adopted for erosion control and maintenance of irrigation works, is still the joint responsibility of cultivators and traditional institutions, led by the principal landlords in each area, are responsible for management of resources.

However, from the mid-1960s, with the establishment of revenue records, all common land and unsurveyed land was declared public property. It was not difficult for the influential tribal gentry, with the collaboration of revenue officials, to impose "enclosure" on common land and obtain its titles, (Ahmed 1975, Buzdar 1987). Consequently the common rangeland dwindled while the number of small ruminants increased enormously.

Pasture

All uncultivated land, rangeland, and cultivated land after harvest are designated as pasture. In some parts of Baluchistan, no specific rights of usufruct, or institutional arrangements to maintain pastures, exist. In these areas, all natives and nomads have free access to pasture. According to custom and local convention, wild vegetation is recognised as a gift of nature, and there is no restriction on its use. Cultivated land after harvest is also used as pasture, either by the owners themselves or, when it contains crop residue, on payment by the user. For example, pastoralist tribes of Kalat District migrate to Kachhi District in late autumn to find pasture for their flocks and refuge from the harsh winter. In Kachhi, and in most parts of Kalat District, specific pasture rights do not exist. However, the nomadic life-style of people in Kalat results in the closure of their pastures for about four or five months, and this permits the pasture to regenerate.

However, in other areas of Baluchistan, where pastoralism has been the predominant economic activity, pastures are specified and institutional arrangements for their management also exist. According to Buzdar (1987), among some tribes, the institution of range closure provides for regeneration of pastures. The practice of range closure varies from tribe to tribe and from area to area. In some tribes, the closure period lasts from one to four months, among other tribes it lasts only for a few weeks, and some tribes may not exercise closure periods at all. Where closure is practised, sanctions are applied to enforce it. At the beginning of the closure period, the entire community moves to other areas and returns home at a predetermined time. The institution of range closure and a common property regime for range management still survives in a limited number of areas.

It has been argued that, to achieve an economy of scale in grazing, common property rights over rangeland are economically more efficient than private property rights (Dahlman 1980, Dani 1987, and Buzdar 1987). However, 'common property regime' is a broad term. Empirically, in Baluchistan, it only means ownership by the authoritarian tribal gentry who are able to coerce others into managing the resources and production capacity (Ahmed 1975). The 'common property regime' is effective only at a lower level of the population hierarchy. According to some studies, the optimum level had been exceeded in Baluchistan by the early 1970s (Bhatti 1970, Babar 1973, and Buzdar 1987).

Over-exploitation of commonly owned rangeland is not necessarily the result of the disappearance of institutions for common property management. It can also be seen in relation to the large increase in small ruminants over a relatively short period. The two questions, the removal or weakening of common property management institutions and an extremely large increase in the small ruminant population, cannot be separated. Initially, the rapid increase in the small ruminant population might have occurred due to the weakening of institutions for the common management of rangeland. On the other hand, a rapid increase in flock sizes might have contributed to the weakening and removal of institutions for common property management. These questions are important for Baluchistan and empirical investigations are necessary before arriving at any firm conclusion.

The institutions for common property management in tribal society were able to prevent over-exploitation of rangeland only among the lower echelons of the population and were unable to devise a sustainable resource management system. The indigenous system of resource management still prevails in some parts of Baluchistan, but the institutional structure is unable to help solve the problems caused by small ruminants. Appropriate training and technical assistance can strengthen the capacity of endogenous institutions to manage resources in a sustainable manner. ICARDA is at present experimenting with different types of forage. For the first time, a research programme for the development of pastures is on the agenda.

Water

There is an acute shortage of water in a large number of areas. Its proper management can, to some extent, solve the problem of scarcity. *Karez* (underground water channels), springs, rivers, rain, and floods are the major water sources. Specific rights of water users have been established for generations. Most of the perennial water is the property of a tribe, a lineage, or a specified group of users. The user-group is responsible for maintenance of the water source and water course. The institutional structure guarantees access to all legitimate users and provides a mechanism to ensure maintenance work by them. Distribution of water among different users is a settled issue and a *mir-i-aab* (water manager), appointed by the community, is responsible for just distribution of perennial water. In flood irrigated areas, where inundation canals and diversion dams are required, all the cultivators in the area are responsible for maintenance work. Sometimes, in heavy floods, dams are washed away and canals get silted, requiring an enormous amount of work. Water management is the joint responsibility of the villages in these areas and the institutional structure requires all users to participate in rehabilitation work. Absentees from the work are bound to pay labour costs for the work they have not performed.

Drinking water often comes from ponds filled by rain and floods and is consumed by both men and beasts. In times of shortage, its use is restricted to the local community and nomads or seasonal migrants are not allowed to use it for themselves or for their animals. This is largely due to the fact that water shortages force the migration of villagers to other areas.

Organisational Aspects

After the legal foundation of the tribal system was abolished in 1976, removing the judicial powers of the *sardars* (tribal chiefs), there was a marked disintegration of traditional institutions and values. Metamorphoses in property relations, organisation of agricultural production, and communications are distinctly visible in some rural areas where the progressive reduction of economic and political dependence on the *sardar* has led to situations conducive to the development of alternative institutional structures. The authoritarian structure is declining, giving way to a new and less centralised power relationship. In this period of transition, broad-based organisational structures can be created and sustained with appropriate external support and assistance. This has created opportunities for projects, such as the ones outlined in Chapter One, to organise and encourage the sustainable management of local resources.

The tribal system provided *sardars* with some control over the tribal levy force. Since they were responsible for maintenance of law and order and administration of justice, tribal chiefs enforced law and order through the control of heads of lineage or smaller kin groups. These lineage heads also paid taxes to their chiefs for parts of their estates. They had influence at the local level but were unable to mediate without the approval of the *sardar*. The abolition of the *sardari* system reduced their dependence on *sardars* and the Government actively supported them to help augment their power. Previously, district administrators only dealt with tribal chiefs but now they deal with local level leaders.

The power of 'local influentials' is indicated by the local government elections in 1983 and 1988. The 1983 elections brought 'local influentials', from some areas of Kachhi district, into conflict with the overlord of the tribal chiefs of Saravan. The conflict resulted in many deaths. Accordingly, in 1988, the local government elections were not held in Kachhi district. Instead, the district administrator negotiated with the 'local influentials' and they "hand picked" councillors for all the union councils.

Disintegration of the tribal system brought another layer of social power, the 'local influentials', into prominence. These are the people who really matter in the villages. Instead of approaching ordinary villagers, the government officials sought cooperation from local power holders. It is the local power holder who can make the visits of an official to the village comfortable. For an official, this amounts to due recognition of his status and acknowledgment of his power. Naturally, the power structure of the village cannot be altered overnight but organisational effort could be directed towards mass mobilisation to make these 'local influentials' more responsive and responsible to the community. This is possible because most of the development schemes (e. g. irrigation works) provide maximum benefit to 'local influentials' who own large shares of the resources in the village, although their benefit to the villagers who earn their livelihood from these resources cannot be underestimated. Benefits are more equally distributed in water supply schemes which reduce the burden of fetching water from long distances and eliminate the need to migrate in search of drinking water.

'Local influentials' have their role in the community, not only because of economic pre-eminence but also due to their linkages with members of their own class and their influence with the local administration. However, the colonial bureaucratic attitude, that treats everyone in the village as lower class, except its landed gentry, should be changed among officials; particularly among those responsible for local government and rural development.³ Government officials deal only with influential villagers and seek their cooperation in mass mobilisation or in implementing development schemes. This further strengthens the role of 'local influentials' in the community and they remain intermediaries between the villagers and the State. Unfortunately, traditional relationships between the landed gentry and the government officials are still strong and this hampers development of broad based institutions. This is largely due to the fact that the problem of law and order in the countryside is tackled through authoritarian structures.

THE PAK-GERMAN SELF-HELP PROJECT

The Pak-German Self-Help Project was started in 1983, following an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in August 1982. This Project is today a leader in the field of rural development in Baluchistan. The Project is striving to induce changes and bring improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of people in the project area. The total project allocation (up to 1990) is around Rs 93 million, of which DM 7.67 million (Rs 61.65 million) is development assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. The local component of Rs 31.25 million comes from annual development plans. The total expenditure incurred by the Project, by the end of March 1989, was a little over Rs 44 million and the balance with the Project is Rs 48.85 million.

The basic objective of the Project is improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the rural poor by inculcating the spirit of self-help and by supporting self-help groups at the village level. Within a conceptual framework of self-help, the Project experimented with different approaches in implementation. It has periodically reviewed its policy and this has led to changes in its approach and methodology of implementation.

The Orientation Phase

In 1982, a grant of DM six million from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany was provided to finance small-scale development schemes for self-help groups in the rural areas of Baluchistan. It supported schemes requiring financial support in the range of DM 2,500 and DM 50,000. Schemes designed to meet the basic needs of food, potable water, clothing, housing, health, and education were accorded high priority. The self-help groups were required to contribute at least 20 per cent of the cost themselves and financial assistance was channelled through the Local Government Department (LGD). The LGD was entrusted with the responsibility of assisting self-help groups by providing them with the relevant information and helping them to apply for assistance. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was made responsible for authorising the implementation of schemes and disbursement of financial assistance.

The initial procedure was complicated and had many procedural bottlenecks. It was decided that the LGD would invite applications from the self-help groups, scrutinise these applications, and forward them with comments to the Economic Affairs Division, of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, for onward transmission to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Islamabad. The Embassy would examine these applications to check if the required information had been provided and forward them to the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation. Finally, the GTZ would decide which schemes to implement and disburse financial assistance accordingly (GTZ n.d.). Not only was the procedure very lengthy, it was also impractical.

An advertisement was given that invited applications from self-help groups with a view to financing small scale development schemes in rural Baluchistan on the basis of 20 per cent of the investment being met from the group's own resources. The priority areas listed in the advertisement were bio-gas plants, agricultural equipment and machinery, erosion control,

establishment of schools, and building teachers' residences. Several thousand applications were received and scrutinising them became an arduous task.

The self-help groups, designated as recipients of the aid, had never existed as institutions. However, it was not difficult for influential people to form such groups in order to obtain assistance for their schemes. Unfortunately, influential rural people are not interested in school buildings and teachers' residences. As a result of the dilemma caused by this overwhelming response, the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn sent a GTZ team, in 1983, to investigate and propose alternative methods of establishing the Project.

The GTZ team, which included the former Project Coordinator, conducted a feasibility study for a full-fledged rural development project in Baluchistan. The team held consultations with representatives of various government agencies and travelled extensively to different parts of the province. After long deliberations on the difficulties involved, it was decided to introduce the rural development programme initially into a limited number of areas. The GTZ team proposed cooperation with the LGD which had field staff, logistics, and knowledge of local conditions. Six union councils viz., Jalal Khan and Mashkaf in Kachhi District, Sharigh in Sibi District, Nisai in Qilla Saifullah District, and Nichara and Dasht in Kalat District, were selected for this purpose.

A union council is the smallest administrative unit in rural areas. It covers an area with a population ranging from 10 to 15 thousand. The local government system allows one councillor each for a population of 1,000 on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Many villages are grouped together to form a union council, and they may also be combined to form an election ward for one councillor. The union council also has representatives of special interest groups, such as peasants, workers, and women, who are indirectly elected by the councillors. The average number of councillors in a union council is 15.

The union council is responsible for planning, supervision, and execution of development activities carried out in its constituent villages. Most union councils have their own financial resources, however small, realised from taxes levied on transportation of goods and from the registration of births and marriages. Union councils also receive a regular government grant of approximately Rs 50,000 per annum and some of their projects are financed by the Government through the District Council. The union councils work under the administration of the LGD which is the executing agency for different development schemes.

Since the Project wanted to establish self-help groups, to decide upon local needs and submit applications for common benefit schemes, it provided LGD field staff with transport and other facilities. Hence, the Development Officer (DO) of the LGD was entrusted with the responsibility of organising self-help groups and of assisting them to apply for development schemes. The LGD, which has been the main agency for rural development programmes in the country, based on its past experience, appointed project committees instead of self-help groups. These project committees consisted of influential people from the villages, who claimed to be representatives of the people and were able to demonstrate their support, and the DO submitted applications for schemes put forward by them.

The Project, on the other hand, only had a limited number of staff, although their visits to the villages provided a forum for discussion of village problems with the project committees. At these meetings, project staff were unable to ascertain whether the schemes were wanted by the majority of villagers and whether benefits would go to a substantial section of the community or not. Nevertheless, these schemes were approved by the Project Coordinator and materials, equipment, and finances were disbursed to the DO who was responsible for their implementation.

It should be noted, however, that the villagers were not organised properly and the schemes were not properly scrutinised to ascertain their feasibility, need, demand, and benefit to the community.

In the absence of these formalities, decisions about schemes were taken quickly by the Project Coordinator. In 1984 and 1985, 293 schemes were sanctioned and some of them ran into trouble because of lack of proper supervision; about 50 schemes remained incomplete until the end of 1986. These schemes included supply of drinking water, development and improvement of irrigation facilities, construction of village protection dams, land levelling, and construction of schools and teachers' residences (See Table 3). Total expenditure on these schemes, over a two year period, was Rs 24 million. During the two year Orientation Phase, the Project brought about some improvements in the socioeconomic conditions in the project area, although it had failed to organise villagers into broad-based community organisations.

In the autumn of 1985, an evaluation team from the head office of GTZ visited the Project. After examining the project strategy and implementation procedure, the evaluation team was very critical. It identified several areas where progress had not been made and suggested methods

Table 3: Schemes Under Different Project Phases

Type of Scheme	Orientation Phase	First and Second Phase	Total	Per Cent
Drinking Water Supply	229	64	293	60
Irrigation	13	0	1	3
Communication	7	22	29	6
Flood Relief/Protection	31	25	56	11
Health and Sanitation	2	2	4	1
Erosion Control	-	4	4	1
Education/School Buildings	27	24	51	10
Women's Programmes	27	-	27	6
Miscellaneous	4	4	8	2
Total	340	145	485	100

of improvement. The evaluation report mentioned some of the conventional shortcomings of rural development programmes in the Project. Some of these, and their remedies, are given below:

1. The Project had failed to organise broad-based self-help groups and had relied on village councils or project committees which were no more than associations of 'local influentials'. It was suggested that formal, broad-based Village Organisations should be formed and enabled to establish self-help or common savings' funds.
2. The staff was too small to supervise the large number of schemes sanctioned.
3. The procedures for scheme approval and fund disbursement were unsatisfactory.
4. The Project lacked an institutional structure which would sustain it after the termination of German economic assistance.

The evaluation team recommended that a self-help unit be created within the LGD, in order to integrate project activities into the LGD so that they could be eventually handed over to the local authorities.

The First Implementation Phase

The evaluation report was submitted in late 1985, and, following this, the GTZ organised a Project Planning Workshop in Quetta to prepare a coherent strategy and a well defined work plan for implementation of the Project. A team of rural development specialists, from the Federal Republic of Germany, was invited to attend the workshop, as well as representatives of different government agencies and the project staff. In this workshop, a Project Planning Matrix was prepared using the ZOPP (*Ziel Orientierte Project Planung* or Goal/Target Oriented Project Planning) methodology. They recognised that the Orientation Phase served the purpose of familiarisation with the political environment, socioeconomic conditions, administrative structure, and constraints; as well as acquisition of first hand knowledge of the basic needs of the rural poor. Thus, the Orientation Phase was to provide a firm foundation for the development of the First Implementation Phase which took place between 1986 and 1988.

In the first implementation phase, the Project's goal, *"improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the rural poor"* was rephrased as *"improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the rural poor through better utilisation of local resources"*. The Project pursued specific goals for which objectively verifiable indicators were worked out. In view of the evaluation report and workshop recommendations, the following changes were introduced at the beginning of the First Implementation Phase:

1. The concept of the VO was introduced to impart the self-help philosophy through popular participation and institution building.
2. The project management base was broadened through the participation of the LGD.
3. Previously, the Project Coordinator alone was responsible for decision making and fund disbursement. In this phase, the LGD became an equal partner in management, implementation, and financing of the Project.
4. A Self-Help Unit was created in the Project.

The Project is now under the overall supervision of the Chief Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary (Planning and Development), and the Secretary of LGD, Government of Baluchistan, to whom the project management is responsible. The project management, in the initial stages of the First Implementation Phase, consisted of the Project Coordinator and the Director of the LGD, Government of Baluchistan.

The Director of the LGD, because of his other engagements and the physical separation of his office from the Project Office, could not fulfill all his responsibilities. In view of these difficulties, the Director deputed one of his Assistant Directors to be a Liaison Officer in the Project Office. The Director of LGD who made these arrangements was transferred in 1987. The new incumbent delegated his powers to the Liaison Officer and redesignated him Project Manager. Theoretically, the Director of the LGD and the Project Coordinator constitute the management of the Project. The redesignation of the Liaison Officer as the Project Manager, with enhanced jurisdiction, has made the project management lopsided. The Project Manager, who officiates on behalf of the Director of the LGD has become the *de facto* counterpart of the Project Coordinator.

Formation of Village Organisation

The concept of the Village Organisation (VO), developed at Comilla and Daudzai, and at present implemented with considerable success by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, is a major breakthrough in rural development strategy. The Project decided to apply this concept of the VO in Baluchistan. The Training Section of the Project, and the development officers (DO) of the LGD, were deputed to disseminate the concept of the VO in the project area. Villagers were trained in organisational matters and encouraged to organise broad-based VOs in their respective villages.

In the autumn of 1986, the Project organised a grand convention of VO leaders, prospective VO leaders, and other villagers to explain the concept of the VO in the strategy of self-help for rural development. In most villages, VOs were formed in August-September of 1986. An ideal VO is required to meet the following conditions:

- o participation of a sizeable majority of the villagers,
- o elected leadership,
- o establishment of a joint savings' fund,
- o regular contributions to the savings' fund (monthly amount to be determined by the VO),
- o regular monthly meetings to discuss problems, identify felt needs, and fix priorities,
- o development of plans for solving their problems,
- o submission of the proceedings of meetings to the Project,
- o forwarding of schemes to the Project for approval,
- o implementation of schemes, and
- o nomination of local inhabitants for training in different fields to facilitate village self-reliance.

Some constraints were observed in the formation of VOs. This is because some villages are dominated by powerful landlords who often assume leadership of the VOs. Dependence on these landlords prevents villagers from challenging their leadership. In some communities there are sharp class differences and these villages do not succeed in eliciting popular participation in the VO, and the absence of consensus restricts the ability of the VO to get schemes sanctioned by the Project. Communities composed of small landowners, who are relatively prosperous due to perennial irrigation and cash crop cultivation, have not responded to the Project's organisational approach or to the development initiative. These communities are marred by factionalism and have made their VOs arenas for internecine political struggles. Conflict, rather than consensus, is the predominant social process in such communities. On the other hand, communities with a vast majority of tenant-cum-small landholders are more responsive, enterprising, and eager to extend cooperation. In such communities the organisational potential is utilised, and, consequently, they benefit from the project. They have not only achieved consensus in decision-making but fully participate in scheme implementation. In many villages it is difficult to find literate persons and the VOs depend on the LGD field staff to record the minutes of their meetings and report to the Project. This presents problems because the implementing agency -- the LGD field staff -- has its own style of work and priorities that are distinct from those of the Project and the VO, and it has not successfully internalised the self-help philosophy.

Rural development projects in different countries have been criticised for their inability "*to mobilise the savings potential of peasantry*" (Griffin and Khan 1982,242). It should be noted that one of the important aspects of the rural development strategy followed by the Project is the development of the savings' potential of villagers. The VO is required to establish and maintain a joint savings' fund with regular contributions from all members. The monthly contribution is determined by the VO members and their savings are deposited in the bank by the DO. In the First Implementation Phase, the Project sanctioned a large number of schemes for physical infrastructure to help the VOs in capital formation. Labour for these schemes was provided by VO members and they were paid daily wages, according to the prevailing market rate in different areas, and were required to deposit 25 per cent of the wages so earned in the VO savings' account. These schemes not only provided the means for capital formation at the village level, but they also inculcated the habit of saving among the villagers.

Implementation of Schemes

The Project adopted a logical and efficient strategy for the approval of development schemes. Theoretically, the scheme is planned by the VO and submitted to the union council DO who forwards it to the Project Office. In practice, the VO reports to the DO who prepares the application for the scheme on the prescribed proforma. The field staff of the LGD check the scheme's feasibility and prepare estimates for its implementation. The application, duly signed by all VO members and accompanied by a report on the regularity of savings and meetings of the VO, is then sent to the Project Office. In the Project Office, the application is examined to check that the information is complete and in order. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit reports on the operational status of the VO and its activities. Then, the application is sent to the Technical Section to check the scheme's feasibility. After this scrutiny, the application is submitted to the Project Manager of the LGD and the Project Coordinator for approval.

The Project considers all schemes submitted by the VOs and approves them if they are found appropriate for meeting basic needs or laying the foundation for improved socioeconomic conditions in the village as a whole. The Project is demand-oriented, has no fixed yearly budget for the implementation of development schemes, and it considers and implements all schemes designed to meet the felt needs of villagers (see Table 3 above). The DO is informed of approval and the first advance for implementing the scheme is disbursed by the Project. The Project requires that local materials be used where available, as well as local labour. In all schemes, use of draught animals is preferred over mechanical means.

The Project intervenes through the VO and provides services in developing physical infrastructure, agriculture, livestock, health, education, improvements in sanitation, women's programmes (particularly income generating activities), rural finance, and introduction of appropriate technology. Programme components have only been provided in an integrated manner in some villages, however, and this is mainly due to political problems and sociocultural constraints. The agriculture and livestock section has organised a few activities only for union councils in Kachhi and Quetta district due to the shortage of personnel (see Table 3) and the Women's Section concentrates its efforts in five union councils only. Kenwari, Baghao, and Panjpai union councils have not received the same attention and assistance as other union councils in the project area. Theoretically, however, the programme components are coherent and will be extremely beneficial if implemented in an integrated manner throughout the project area.

Under the First Implementation Phase, the Project was extended to nine union councils with a total number of 450 villages. However, these union councils were not contiguous and were spread throughout four different districts. By the end of 1988, 181 VOs had been organised in 179 villages. The total number of VO members was 4,380 and their total savings amounted to Rs 1.65 million; the maximum individual saving being Rs 78,000. A total of 127 schemes, with an estimated expenditure of Rs 18.2 million, were approved by the Project, of which 38 were completed and 89 were in different stages of implementation.

The Second Implementation Phase

The experience gathered and problems encountered, during the two years of the First Implementation Phase, necessitated a review of the procedures and policies, in order to provide a firm foundation for the continuity of the Project. Based on the evaluations and expertise of an external consultant, major policy and administration changes were introduced from the latter half of 1988, and these may be regarded as the Second Implementation Phase of the Project.

One of the unsettled questions is the interaction between LGD and the GTZ. No set pattern has emerged and different options are being considered. In the First Implementation Phase, project activities increased in different directions, and this required decentralisation of the Project Office which was the basis for a new administrative structure.

New Management Structure¹

The Project has established five different sections and two units. They are the Training Section, Social Development Section, Women's Section, Agriculture and Livestock Section, Technical Section, Administrative Unit, and Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. This structure was developed according to the Project Planning Matrix and takes into account the division of labour. The record of the past several months indicates that project implementation is increasingly efficient. Each of these specialised sections is responsible for specific programme components and their activities are coordinated by the respective section heads. All section heads meet regularly every week to review the previous week's progress and to plan for the following week. These meetings serve to coordinate the different programmes, because the minutes are circulated to all project sections.

1. The management structure here represents the situation in April 1989 and does not reflect the recent changes whereby the LGD project staff are under the Director of LGD, who has been designated as the Project Director (PD). This also implies changes in the status and title of the Project Manager (PM) as given in this description.

The project staff is bifurcated into two categories: one employed by GTZ and the other employed by the LGD of the Government of Baluchistan. All sections and units employ staff from both the GTZ and the LGD apart from the Training, Agriculture and Livestock, and Social Development Sections. The GTZ staff consists of expatriate senior professionals and their local employees who make up the junior level staff for the most part (one Pakistani is a senior professional). The LGD staff have a Manager who is a district level official of the Provincial Government. All appointments to the LGD Self-help Unit are junior in terms of responsibility and emoluments. In terms of salaries and perquisites, the GTZ professionals and one Pakistani are at the apex, the second layer is filled by local employees of GTZ, and the third tier is occupied by Self-help Unit employees of the LGD. The total strength of GTZ and LGD staff in the Project is given in Table 4.

The GTZ junior staff members draw larger salaries than the LGD employees, and there are a number of differences in terms of employment, tenure, salary, and perquisites which do not make for easy coordination. On the other hand, GTZ employees lack security of tenure, while the latter are permanent employees of the Government of Baluchistan. In July 1988, GTZ introduced a new and uniform rate of daily allowances for field visits for all employees of the Project and this has helped equalise the situation to some extent.

Table 4: Project Staffing

Sections	No. of Staff		
	GTZ	LGD	TOTAL
Management	1	1	2
Monitoring & Evaluation	1	3	4
Administration	20	16	36
Training	2	0	2
Engineering	5	3	8
Agriculture & Livestock	3	0	3
Women's Section	6	3	9
Social Development	4	0	4
Total	42	26	68

Assistant Directors and gave him the designation of Project Manager (PM), who is the counterpart of the Deputy Project Coordinator.

However, the PC and PM are not congruent positions in any respect. The two are neither theoretically counterparts nor do the two appointments correspond. There are substantial differences in terms of salary, perquisites, authority, and the sphere of influence between the PC and the PM. The PC is responsible to GTZ headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany, while the PM is responsible to the Director of the LGD, Government of Baluchistan. The PC deals with, and exercises influence over, the seniormost officials of the Province: the Chief Secretary, the Additional Chief Secretary (P & D), and the Secretary, LGD, while the PM is a subordinate of the Director of the LGD who is a subordinate of the Secretary of the LGD. The position of the PM in the Self-help Unit is not a permanent appointment and any district level official of the LGD can be assigned to the post (the present PM is the third incumbent since July 1986). Past attempts on the part of the PMs to obtain some control over decision making and over financial resources have tended to cause problems within the Project between the GTZ staff and the LGD field staff.

There is a discrepancy in working hours between LGD and GTZ employees in the same office. LGD employees work six days a week, from 8 am to 2 pm, while GTZ employees work five days a week, from 8 am to 3 pm². LGD project staff are under the PM and the Director of LGD, not under the jurisdiction of the PC and this restricts the PC's authority to supervise their work. This obviously creates divisions between the LGD and the GTZ staff even though loyalty to the organisation is invoked when the situation so demands³.

Programme Emphases

Training: In the Second Implementation Phase (since mid 1988), the Project has laid emphasis on training villagers in different fields rather than on establishing a physical infrastructure. The villagers are nominated for training in different trades and skills, by their VOs. The largest training programme is in health education; it is run by the Women's Section, and provides training for Community Health Workers (CHW) and *dais*. Next are the training programmes run by the Agriculture and Livestock Section. These schemes not only enhance individual skills but are a good measure of the response to non-financial incentives. Participation in these schemes also indicates the degree of cooperation with the Project, over the long term, as well as the extent to which the self-help philosophy has been internalised (See Table 5).

Women's Programme: The women's programme operates in four out of nine union councils in the project area. It has not been extended to the other five because of political problems and sociocultural constraints on the participation of women. The Women's Section concentrates its programmes in health education on the training of *dais* (traditional birth attendants), information about nutrition and hygiene, and training community health workers in knowledge about waste disposal and matters related to general cleanliness and sanitation. Another important activity is in income generating schemes for women whereby village women are encouraged to raise poultry (for which the Project assists them in acquiring better breeds and in providing vaccines for chickens). The development of a traditional skill (embroidery) has become a means

2. These hours have changed, as of 1990, to 9 a.m to 2 p.m, for LGD employees, and 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., for GTZ employees.
3. Since 1990 there have been some organisational changes instituted to bring about a closer working relationship between the GTZ and the LGD.

Table 5: Training Schemes^a

Nature of Training	Number	Per Cent
Workshops & Conventions	47	23.5
Organisational Matters	83	41.5
Agriculture	8	4.0
Livestock	15	7.5
Technical Training	25	12.5
Health Training	21	10.5
Total	199	100.0^b

Note:

- a. These schemes were implemented between January 1984 and December 1988.
- b. Total may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding errors.

Source : Monthly Monitoring Report, December 1988.

of realising a regular source of income by marketing the products. The improvement of resource use, environment, and health is facilitated by the construction of fuel-saving cooking stoves which are both fuel efficient and less polluting.

Loan Scheme: The Project also started an internal lending scheme -- lending to the VO members according to their own savings -- as a test case in two villages. This programme has been a tremendous success and the recovery rate was 100 per cent within the scheduled deadline. In 1989, the Project agreed to finance loans equal to 200 per cent of the VO savings in these two villages. For this, criteria have been developed for grading the VOs whereby the number of plus points on a given scale determines eligibility for loans.

The VOs benefiting from "internal lending" have had a unique opportunity for experience in financial management. These VOs were able to recover 100 per cent loans with interest from their members, and the loans helped villagers to purchase seeds for the 1988 sorghum crop. Although the loans have not as yet succeeded in freeing villagers from resorting to money-lenders, who charge an exorbitant rate of interest, it has nevertheless reduced dependence on the traditional financial market to a large extent. Lending will increase by 100 per cent during 1989, and it is expected that, if the present recovery rate continues throughout 1990, the necessity of

traditional financial market to a large extent. Lending will increase by 100 per cent during 1989, and it is expected that, if the present recovery rate continues throughout 1990, the necessity of resorting to money-lenders will disappear completely. A recovery rate of 100 per cent, in early 1989, is clearly an indicator of the ability of the sponsored institutional structure to manage its financial affairs. The current state of savings is in Table 6 and 7. Project-sponsored institution-building on the other hand met with different attitudes and expectations in different areas, resulting in a variable degree of success. The factors contributing to this will be discussed in detail in the conclusions.

Monitoring: The DO is responsible for preparing the monthly progress reports for each VO in the union council, and these should include information on the regularity of savings, meetings, and a brief summary of the scheme or assistance demanded. The progress report is sent to the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit which is responsible for the maintenance of records for each individual village in the union council. Information and feedback linkages between the LGD field staff and the Project are maintained by monthly review meetings at the office in Quetta. The first session of the review meeting is attended by the DO and the Self-help Unit of the LGD and the second session is attended by the DOs and the GTZ section heads at the Project Office.

Table 6: Village Organisations (VOs) and Savings

Union Council	No. of Villages	No. of VOs	No. of Members	Total Savings (Rupees)
Sharigh	20	11	240	52,853
Jalal Khan	76	24	835	4,54,922
Mashkaf	37	13	321	1,59,743
Nachara	35	40	956	4,49,987
Dasht	97	21	358	1,49,456
Nisai	44	17	437	1,82,805
Kinwari	53	18	597	2,53,017
Baghao	111	28	369	85,922
Panjpai	16	9	328	76,387
Total	489	181	4483	1,865,092

Source: Monthly Project Report, March 1989.

Table 7: Savings of Village Organisations^a

Savings in Rupees	No. of VOs	Per Cent of VOs Represented
Less than 10,000	123	68
10,000 - 20,000	28	15
20,000 - 30,000	20	11
30,000 - 40,000	7	4
40,000 - 50,000	0	0
50,000 - 60,000	2	1
60,000 - 70,000	0	0
70,000 - 80,000	1	1
Total	181	100

Note:

- a. These savings correspond to the records as of the end of March 1989.

Source : Monthly Project Report, March 1989.

The Project has also established inter-disciplinary teams (ID teams) to monitor the functioning of the VOs, the implementation of schemes in the villages, and, more importantly, to monitor and support the institution building efforts of the Project. Each ID team has members from different sections of the Project, section heads are team advisors, and the DO of the concerned union council is the ex-officio team leader. Each section head is the advisor to one ID team and in this capacity is responsible for one or more specific union councils. The teams visit villages, collect information about the VOs, examine the schemes under completion, and submit reports. Problems arose because some of the early reports did not always agree with reports submitted by the DOs and the former Project Manager and some of the DOs. However, in the course of a few months, the ID teams justified their existence and the efficiency of programme implementation improved. The ID teams also motivated the languid and stagnant VOs by reiterating the project's objectives, approach, and rules of cooperation and this strengthened the community organisations.

Like other aspects of the Project, the monitoring system has undergone changes after periodic reviews and has consequently become an exemplary system for other projects as well. Until the First Implementation Phase, the monitoring system was based on implementation of development schemes. All the earlier monitoring system produced was information concerning the implementation status of different schemes. From the commencement of the Second Implementation Phase, the Project has developed an efficient monitoring system by using the

various components of the ZOPP Project Planning Matrix. The Monitoring and Evaluation unit prepares regular Mid-Monthly Monitoring Reports (MMR) and Monthly Monitoring Reports. Since March 1989, the Monthly Monitoring Report has been rearranged and renamed the Monthly Project Report (MPR). The new MPR is integrated with the Project Planning Matrix (PPM). Information is organised on the basis of eight components spelled out in the PPM with two appendices; one a short summary of the project area and the other a short summary of development work in nine union councils in the project area. Targets based on the objectively verifiable indicators for each result are the main feature of the report. The MPR notes the achievements as well as the shortcomings for each specific project. It is sent to all the DOs in the project area, section heads, and management of the Project before the monthly review meeting, and the monthly review meeting analyses and appraises the achievements; as well as discussing the shortcomings and solutions to them.

The MMR prepared by the M & E unit is based on information at the union council level which is provided by the DOs on the Village Report Forms, as well as on the field visit reports submitted by the project staff. The MMR is sent to all section heads, who are also ID team advisors responsible for specific union councils, and to the management. The MMR is discussed by the project management and section heads during a monthly meeting held to review project implementation. The ID team advisors review shortcomings for the specific month and plan activities to increase efficiency. Thus, the monitoring system is an integral part of the PPM.

Problems in Implementation

The Project has encountered different types of difficulties in implementing schemes. In the initial phase, it was found that "*Many applications (for assistance) turned out to be fake*" (Jerve 1985:99), and these applications were submitted through the LGD. To solve this problem, the Project increased the field and supervisory staff in the Orientation Phase. Because of the experimental nature of the programme at that time, the overhead costs were about one third of the implementation cost. The overhead costs for the First Implementation Phase and the Second Implementation Phase are not available.

During the First Implementation Phase, there were a number of financial irregularities. In some cases, implementation cost was substantially more than the approved expenditure, and, in other cases, the materials used were not according to the prescribed and approved specifications. In addition, the Project also received complaints concerning non-payment to the contractors. Most of the DOs are interested only in infrastructural schemes such as the construction of dams, bridges, culverts, rural roads, school buildings, irrigation works, and water supply schemes.

These schemes are implemented by the LGD field staff who, in some instances, benefit personally; thus increasing the costs considerably and delaying implementation. For example, one lined water tank in Nichara Union Council, at an estimated cost of Rs 250,000, was started in early 1988 but the DO kept demanding more funds and, after an expenditure of Rs 560,000, it is still incomplete. This is not the only scheme to suffer from such problems.

Communication Problems

The Project faces different types of communication problems at different levels. The senior professionals are Germans, proficient in English but unable to communicate in Urdu which is the *lingua franca* and the so-called official language of the Government (actually all communications at senior level are in English). The project staff can speak English but their ability to write in English is limited. Some problems are not properly communicated to the

management because of this handicap. The Project does not require its section staff to prepare monthly performance reports either and, even field visit reports are produced on a one page proforma which requires only a few sentences. In view of the LGD-GTZ relationship in the Project office and project area, the GTZ employees should report their field experiences in detail, analyse the current situation, and make suggestions and recommendations on the basis of their own experiences. This can be fulfilled only if the staff are allowed to write in Urdu. A summary of their reports can be translated into English for the management.

Baluchistan is a multilingual province where several languages and many dialects are spoken and the project area is scattered all over Baluchistan. The languages and dialects spoken in the project area include *Baluchi, Brohi, Pushto, Sindhi, Saraiki, Khetrani*, and *Lassi* but it is very difficult for the Project to find polyglot field staff. This is a problem for other development agencies as well. While most men can speak more than one language, most women in the villages speak only their native tongue. The desirability of communicating with different linguistic groups in their own languages should be taken into consideration when making staff appointments.

At the village level, the DO and the project field staff are two important communication channels. We have noted that some of the project staff have internalised the traditional values of the colonial bureaucracy. On field visits they often meet the DO first and request him or his subordinate to accompany them to the village. Likewise, in the village they search for VO leaders rather than other villagers, and this is contrary to the spirit of the principle that the villagers "*are very happy if somebody comes and asks them what their problem is and tries to help them*" (Khan 1976,213). Institution building at the village level will succeed if the Project staff can encourage self-confidence among villagers who are trying to emerge from a limited environment of authoritarianism and economic dependence. A dynamic attitude is necessary for this, and bureaucratic attitudes and social distance between the project staff and the villagers need to be removed.

Village problems are discussed in VO meetings, but the minutes of these meeting are sometimes recorded by the LGD field staff because most VOs have no literate members. LGD field staff do not attend VO meetings but record whatever is reported to them by the VO leaders, and this means that many problems discussed in the meetings are not recorded. Sometimes the minutes are reduced to mere repetition over several months. The LGD field staff are more interested in schemes related to agriculture, livestock, and health care. In some cases, villagers claim to have discussed the latter type of schemes in their meetings but this was not communicated to the Project by its own field staff or by the DO (see village studies of Khumbri and Gola Basti).

Sociocultural values of gift exchange, which were once restricted to the kin group, are now extended to the wider secondary group. In some cases this has caused problems for the recipients and the donors. Sycophancy, with a view to obtaining official patronage, is not uncommon and is practised in more than one form as a result of the extension of such sociocultural values. Some of the DOs and VO leaders make elaborate arrangements for project staff during their field visits and, no doubt, expect favours in return. Attempts should be made to limit these practices since, in one significant instance, they led to the approval of schemes that are a wastage of resources by any standards (see village profile of Killi Musa Khan Jumma Khan).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Principal Conclusions

The principal conclusions, regarding the impact of the project, the status of resource management systems prevalent in the area, and the role of institutional innovations, are as follows:

- o Despite the fact that irrigation works have been sponsored by the Project through the VOs, they are still managed by indigenous institutions. Project-sponsored institutions still do not have a role in managing these resources.
- o Institutional innovation has been adopted successfully in areas where it played a major part in management of financial resources. The VOs are more successful in areas where poverty and indebtedness are both prevalent and where indigenous institutions are strong. These VOs have emerged as viable institutions in financial management.
- o The most important social change is disintegration of the traditional tribal system. The centralised and authoritarian political organisation has almost vanished, although its kinship-based organisation is still prominent. The diminishing political authority of the *sardars* has resulted in increased power for lineage heads and village leaders who have emerged as 'local influentials'. Economic resources are also more widely distributed because of these changes which have been largely induced by the State.

The Project

The following are the conclusions pertaining to the Project in particular:

- o In the initial phase, the Project implemented development schemes presented by village project committees consisting of 'local influentials'. Three hundred and fifty-five were implemented and some of these were of little benefit to the community. Some schemes remained incomplete due to local disputes and some due to lack of supervision by project staff. This led to the revision of Project Strategy.

In the Orientation Phase, the Project solicited self-help contributions for schemes. In the case of physical infrastructure, contributions were provided by villagers in the form of free labour, and local leaders were able to mobilise villagers to work on these schemes. This perpetuated the traditional pattern of landlords exacting free labour from peasants. It was not an innovation as such and consequently the project did not succeed in organising broad-based self-help groups at the village level.

During the first implementation phase, from 1986 to 1988, project objectives were clearly defined and activities were systematically planned. Efforts were directed towards institution building at the village level and the LGD was made a partner in management and implementation. LGD was also required to provide 50 per cent of the finances to implement schemes and institution building was entrusted to LGD field staff and the Training Section of the Project. The project area was also extended to three more union councils, and one hundred and eighty one VOs were organised. The Project paid wages to VO members who worked on infrastructural schemes, and twenty five per cent of the wages were deposited in the joint savings' account of the VO. This helped to establish the VOs.

- o During the Second Implementation Phase, which began in 1988, great stress was laid on the training component. Whereas during the Orientation and First Implementation Phases, project activities were not very well planned, in the Second Implementation Phase, the Project organised its staff into different sections and units responsible for specific programmes. A Social Development Section was created and given responsibility for institution building.
- o Evolution of the Project in the Second Implementation Phase was characterised by learning from experience instead of initiating activities in a pre-planned manner. Some activities were started first and the staff recruited later. The Social Development Section has now been given the responsibility of assessing the existing VOs and improving their performance.

The Project Impact

The conclusions concerning the impact of the Project are as follows:

- o The Project has had an impact on the life of people throughout the project area, irrespective of the VO's status and the extent of its functioning. In the Orientation Phase, the Project approved 355 physical infrastructure schemes for water supply, irrigation, agriculture, land development, erosion control, school buildings, and road construction. Scarcity of water, which forced people to migrate, is no longer a problem in most of the project area as almost 59 per cent of all schemes were for improvement of water supply.

There have been changes in the livestock sector and in the traditional semi-nomadic life style. There are marked trends towards market production, and this has led to an increase in herd sizes. Establishment of "enclosures", on commonly owned rangeland, and scarcity of pastures had compelled large numbers of pastoralists to search for alternative livelihoods. They are now mostly wage labourers in towns and have started to build permanent houses. Until recently, their entire household assets were loaded on to donkeys or camels and they were obliged to travel with their herds in search of fuel and fodder.

- o The Project has assisted two such nomadic communities to acquire housing plots and construct houses in Killi Jumma Khan Musa Khan. The first community of landless labourers had been forced out of their villages due to scarcity of irrigation and drinking water and their winter camping grounds had been taken over by farmers. The second was a community of small landowners-cum-sheep breeders who abandoned the nomadic life because they were unable to find adequate pastureland or afford payments for fodder. The Project has been able to help communities to adjust to social and economic changes, accept wage labour, and exchange subsistence for market production.
- o The Project has made considerable efforts to develop human resources. A large number of education and training schemes, involving different socioeconomic groups, were implemented. They included training programmes in basic health, poultry farming, agriculture and horticulture, livestock, and training of Community Health Workers and VO leaders. The Project has also helped VOs to establish schools for their children and, gradually, villagers are beginning to send their children to school.
- o Integration of women in development activities has been undertaken in some villages of the project area. Income generating schemes, such as poultry raising and embroidery, have been successfully initiated, and the Project has helped village women to acquire improved breeds of poultry and has provided training in chicken vaccination. The Women's Section linked embroidery and crafts' production with the market through Threadlines Gallery in Quetta. It

also conducted health training in some areas. After successful completion of training, the trainees were provided with medical kits, which had been supplied by UNICEF, and some medicines and vitamins donated by the Project. The Women's Section also provided training in the construction of fuel saving stoves in the union councils of Mashkaf and Jalal Khan. The response to this was not as encouraging as in some other training programmes. A kitchen garden programme, that included training in the trickle irrigation technique with porous pitchers, was introduced into a few villages during the First Implementation Phase. Sociocultural constraints are greatest for the women's programme and it had to close down in Nichara in 1988. This has delayed the introduction of programmes in Baghao, Kenwari, and Panjpai. Renewed efforts will be necessary to overcome the constraints caused by lack of education and sociocultural prejudices.

Institution Building

The following conclusions have been drawn concerning institution building; particularly in regard to optimum resource and environmental management.

- o The Project is helping to strengthen popular participation by sponsoring community institutions. With the appropriate knowledge and skills, imparted through training programmes, these institutions may be able to achieve the sustainable management of local resources. In order to improve the implementation of its programmes, the Project has tried different approaches in succeeding phases, with the result that these changes have produced positive results and, in some areas, the Project has successfully nurtured responsible institutions.
- o The Project is trying to induce social change through institutional innovations and, therefore, incorporates the positive features of customs, conventions, values, and social organisations in rural communities. At the same time, it is strengthening the financial, technical, and organisational resources of the community so that it can use its resources in a sustainable manner.
- o Response to the institution building efforts of the Project has varied in different areas according to ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. The role of the LGD field staff, as extension agent, was crucial, because they were entrusted with the responsibility of mobilising organisational resources in the villages. The Project trained LGD field staff as extension agents and catalysts, but some of them failed to understand and internalise the concept of self-help and participation. They concentrated, instead, on saving and stressed that without saving, assistance would not be forthcoming. In terms of schemes, there was a heavy focus on infrastructural innovations. The interpretation of the community organisation concept was often imposed by the DO and as a result, in some villages, the project strategy did not work. In the first quarter of 1989, 55 per cent of the VOs failed to hold meetings while 25 per cent had not added to their savings during the same period. In response to this situation, the Social Development Section of the Project put in a great deal of effort to rectify the concept of self-help and participation propagated by the DOs.

Selected Cases from the Study Villages

In the union councils of Nisai and Sharigh, both *Pathan* areas, the village leaders mostly demand schemes for their private benefit. The VOs in both these union councils are dominated by 'local influentials'. The DO encourages them to save regularly in the hope of obtaining schemes from

the Project, but these VOs rarely seem to hold meetings. Some VOs in these union councils are very small, e.g. ten members. Among their members, some are government employees in other areas, shopkeepers, or migrant labourers who have little interest in cooperation at the village level.

In the first quarter of 1989, only one out of 17 VOs had held meetings in Nisai Union Council, and one VO had made regular savings during this period. Nichara Union Council, ethnically a *Brohi* area, has 40 VOs. None of them held meetings in the first quarter of 1989, and thirty-three of them had not made any additional savings either. In Panjpai, ethnically *Brohi* and *Pathan*, none of the nine VOs held meetings in the first quarter of 1989 but all saved regularly during the same period.

In terms of ethnicity, the *Pathans* and *Brohis* have not responded to project initiatives, although the DOs of these union councils are to be held partly responsible. *Pathan* and *Brohi* communities are based on segmentary lineages with fluid factional coalitions, and they can achieve consensus in matters crucial to their coexistence. Otherwise these communities, however small, are marred by factionalism.

Relative prosperity, through cultivation of cash crops in areas with perennial irrigation, emerges as an obstacle to institution building. In these areas, the 'local influentials' are rich landlords, whereas the other villagers are their tenants and under their control. These influentials demand improvement in irrigation or schemes, that are of limited benefit to the community at large, and organise VOs simply to obtain such schemes. These VOs are not broad-based, do not meet regularly, and, hence, are not effective. The union councils of Nisai, Nichara, and Sharigh are typical examples of places where there are such instances.

Jalambani village is in the union council of Mashkaf. It is a *Brohi* village which has recently achieved prosperity due to cash crop cultivation and improvement in transportation. Although there are no sharp class differences in this lineage-based community, village politics are tarnished by factionalism and the VO became inactive a few months after its establishment.

The majority of villages in Jalal Khan Union Council are inhabited by landless labourers and tenants who cultivate land as share-croppers. They have responded to the project initiatives with enthusiasm. Their landlords have not prevented them from joining the VO, and one obvious reason for this is the shortage of tenants in the area. A vast majority of tenants have contracts to cultivate large areas of land and this is outside their capacity at the present level of technology and services. In some villages, large landlords have also sold small plots of land to their tenants in order to keep them on the land.

Tenants in this area are very poor compared to other areas. However, this is not because they produce less than their needs but because of their dependence on the traditional financial market for loans. Money-lenders support their consumption needs as well as financing seed purchases in the sowing season. The interest rate is ten per cent per month and the lenders are notorious for inflating accounts. Their method of recovery is to some extent responsible for the perpetuation of this economic relationship. The seeds are purchased at a very high price, and, with interest, the account almost doubles by harvest time. By harvest time, the crop prices usually decline substantially (for example in 1988 the price of sorghum was five times higher during the sowing period than at harvest time). It is then that the money-lender recovers his debt and interest by appropriating a very substantial part of the produce. This means that, after clearing the debt, the tenant is left with little surplus, and he has to rely on further loans for his consumption needs.

Until recently, tenants were subject to other exactions, made by the landlord, known as *haboob* (taxes in addition to the crop-sharing agreement). These are over and above the normal contractual share. The term *haboob* covers different types of taxes used to support intermediaries who collect the landlord's share of the produce with which they pay artisans who work for the landlord and pay for *jirga* meetings. Tenants also have to provide a sheep or goat at the birth, marriage, or death of someone in the landlord's family. This form of oppression has, however, to some extent, diminished.

The VOs provided an institutional structure to mobilise savings and disburse loans, and one important factor contributing to their success appears to be the presence or absence of the institutional structure of *thala* or group tenancy. The *thala*, usually a group of several or more close kin tenants, enters into a joint contract with the landlord. It is also a labour cooperative which jointly uses its resources. A village can have several *thalas* and, where they exist, the VO has emerged as a mediating structure or a federation of these *thalas*. Because of the strong cooperative institutional base of the *thala*, the VOs in these villages are more efficient. This institutional structure can be built upon as is obvious by the success of the internal lending programme in two VOs with *thalas*.

The *thala* system is found throughout most of the flood irrigated areas of Kachhi District. The *thala* is a stable institution responsible for the management of land and irrigation resources, and is composed of close kin and headed by the eldest member. In some cases, kinship also contributes to the solidarity of the group.

Under this system, the landlord deals only with the head of the *thala*, or *raiece*, who is responsible for recruiting tenants for land preparation and cultivation. The *raiece* allocates different plots of land to each member and they work individually or even collectively when more labour is required. Every tenant pays a full share to the landlord, except the *raiece* who pays a reduced share since he manages the labour and cultivation. Chronic labour shortages in the area contribute to the perpetuation of the *thala*.

Economic conditions, predominated by want and perpetual indebtedness, in flood-irrigated areas with strong indigenous institutions, have responded to and adopted the VO as an institutional innovation. The majority of tenants in Jalal Khan are *Baluchis* who are not natives of what is now Baluchistan. They migrated to these areas from Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan districts within the past two centuries.

This is an area where want and extreme poverty are prevalent. The people, who have recently been emancipated from the oppressive system, seek to improve their lot. They will risk the wrath of their landlords if the benefits, even in the long run, are greater than the losses (see village profile of Talhar Pathan). They appear content and confident in their own efforts and hard work.

Panjpai Union Council is a sharp contrast to Jalal Khan. Most of the inhabitants in the former are livestock farmers. Agricultural land is irrigated and landholdings are large. About ten per cent of the men are employed by the Public Works Department as labourers in construction and maintenance of roads and buildings. The population is equally distributed between the *Pathan* (*Mishwari*) and *Brohi* (*Samalani*) tribes. Politics are strictly factional. Mutual rivalry is not only endemic but is also sustained through considerable effort. Relative freedom from poverty and want is obvious both in attitudes and actions. The villages in this union council were disinterested in the Project, because, as they frankly admitted, they cannot cooperate with each other due to long standing factional rivalries.

Nine VOs were organised. According to the Supervisor of the union council, none of the VOs held meetings during the past few months although most make regular savings' contributions. In 1987, the Project sanctioned school buildings at the request of three VOs, but these schools were constructed by contractors who failed to complete the roofs of the buildings. The VOs demanded that the buildings be completed but, in the meantime, the roofs were extensively damaged by wind and rain. The contractor received full payment without completing the work, and the VOs have not shown any interest in caring for the three schools which are now in a condition of disrepair. Similarly, the Project provided one VO with a diesel engine for pumping water. When a minor part became broken, the VO did not arrange to have it repaired. Some VOs want to discontinue their savings' contributions and have asked to have their deposits returned.

The LGD field staff also experience difficulties in Panjpai. The DO is rarely able to visit the union council because he does not have a field vehicle. Although the Project provided vehicles for all the project DOs, the jeep for the Panjpai DO was requisitioned by the LGD Department in Quetta. Within the project area, the DOs are responsible for implementing schemes, and funds are disbursed through them. This means that the Panjpai DO was unable to fulfill this duty and, as a result, the Project invited contractors to do the job and funds were directly disbursed to them. The supervisor of the union council is also of the opinion that half of the union council is actually in Pishin District and is simply an added burden for Quetta District staff. Factors such as these have contributed to the lack of institution building in the union council. However, it is the sociocultural set-up of segmentary social organisation, characterised by perpetual conflicts, as well as the relative prosperity of the villagers, that is the most important factor for failure in institution building.

Seasonal migration and pastoral nomadism also have a bearing on project performance. In the temperate zone, some people migrate in winter to relatively warm areas. In the tropical zone, people migrate to relatively cooler places during the summer. Therefore, VO meetings and savings can not be organised for several months in some areas.

Role of the LGD

It is difficult to assess the impact of, and the role in, project management of the LGD. The Project introduced major policy changes from the First Implementation Phase onwards, and the involvement of LGD field staff became more important with the creation of the Self-help Unit. Without LGD assistance, the project staff would not have been able to cover a large number of villages.

It is also important to consider the role of LGD as the main agency responsible for rural development in the country. The LGD has its own style of work and its own priorities. Government agencies usually limit their contact with the public to the elite who, thus, have a significant impact on decision-making. The Project adopted a different strategy and tried to establish contact with the masses to build responsible and representative institutions. It tried to reduce the role of the rural elite by increasing popular participation. Many DOs either did not understand the project philosophy and approach or were reluctant to abandon their previous work style. They have, as yet, not fully succeeded in communicating the project's strategy to the villagers of Baluchistan.

The integration of the rural development project with local government institutions was intended to strengthen institution building and implementation. Integration of the Project with the "elected local government structure" is an important principle of rural development (Khan 1976,213). However, empirical evidence from the project area indicates that sharing

responsibilities with the LGD has not been completely successful even though the Project is being implemented in an autonomous manner.

The Project was initiated with autonomous management. Since the beginning of the First Implementation Phase, with progressive emphasis on the role of the LGD, the project management has become semi-autonomous. Yet, implementation through the Self- help Unit, within the LGD framework, did not work completely. This supports the findings of a World Bank Study that argue that "*institution building has suffered most when reliance on autonomous or semi-autonomous project management units has been substituted for line agencies*" (World Bank 1988,33). However, the fault may not lie in autonomy, as the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme is achieving considerable success in the Northern Areas of Pakistan with autonomous project management.

An important implication of the autonomy of the Project is lack of coordination among different agencies. Autonomous projects, according to the World Bank, "*have not proven very effective in inter-agency coordination*" (1988,34). This is a major problem in Baluchistan where a large number of foreign and international agencies have initiated development projects in different sectors. These projects do not coordinate their activities and the Government of Baluchistan does not insist upon them doing so.

Specific Recommendations

A few specific recommendations have emerged from the present study. The project management may wish to consider them for future implementation:

1. The Project is implemented in nine union councils which are not contiguous. The distance between Baghao Union Council, in Loralai, and Kenwari, in Lasbela, is about 700 miles, and both are far from Quetta. Project staff cannot visit these areas often enough because of the problem of transportation across rough rural roads, over long distances, and lack of accommodation in the field areas. This restricts the ability of project staff to monitor the VO programmes. The Project might have much more impact if it concentrated on a few contiguous districts.
2. The Project has started some of its activities in areas that are relatively prosperous. These are areas with perennial irrigation, such as the union councils of Sharigh, Nichara, and Panjpai. The communities there are segmentary and factional, and this, together with their prosperity, results in a poor response to project initiatives. The Project might want to consider withdrawing its cooperation from such areas if the VO assessment confirms this pattern.
3. Some problems in implementation of the Project can be attributed to the LGD field staff and the LGD Self-help Unit. Division of authority, between the Project Coordinator and the Project Manager, restricts the ability of the management to enforce discipline and supervise project staff. The presence of an autonomous project leader, empowered to supervise all project staff, may improve project implementation.
4. For physical infrastructure schemes, the Project pays daily wages at the rate of Rs 40 per day. In many parts of Baluchistan, even in Quetta, daily wages are much lower. One DO paid daily wages of Rs 50 per day. In one scheme, he employed more than 70 persons per day for construction of a lined water tank. The Project approved these higher daily wage rates to encourage capital formation, since 25 per cent of the wages are compulsorily

deposited in the VO's savings' account. However, in one scheme, VO members (most of whom were government employees) sub-hired labourers at the rate of Rs 30 per day. To avoid such abuses, it is recommended that the daily wage rate be negotiated individually for each development scheme.

ANNEX 1: JALAMBANI

Introduction

Jalambani is located 136 km from Quetta, 33 km from Sibi, and eight km from Dhadar. The village is connected with the main Quetta-Sibi road by eight km of rough shingle road. Administratively, the village is included in Mashkaf Union Council of Dhadar *tehsil* (sub-division) in Kachhi. In Sibi, the average maximum temperature in June was 48.2° C and the minimum mean temperature in June was 30.3° C. The mean maximum and the mean minimum temperatures in December were 25.1° C and 8.2° C respectively. Rainfall is extremely sparse, although it varies greatly year by year in the range of eight to 15 centimeters. (Government of Baluchistan 1981, 13 and 25). The village is located in the Bolan foothills and is subjected to torrential and devastating floods from time to time; the latest being in August 1986 almost twelve years after the previous devastating floods.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The population of Jalambani was 285 (147 males and 138 females) according to the census of 1981. At present the estimated population is 421 persons distributed throughout 54 households. Approximately 46 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age and the total number of old-aged dependents in the village is around 23. The entire population of the village, except the village *moulvi*, can be subsumed into 25 extended families, all *Jalambanis*, a sub-clan of the *Kuchiks*, a clan of the *Rind Baluch* tribe. *Baluchi* is the mother tongue of the inhabitants, but most men can also communicate fluently in *Urdu*, *Sindhi*, *Sariaki*, and *Brohi*. All the inhabitants are adherents of the *Sunni* Sect of Islam.

Village houses are made of mud and mostly consist of two rooms without a separate kitchen, bathroom, or lavatory. All the houses in the village have electricity. Wood and animal excreta are used as fuel while Kerosene oil and electricity are used for light.

A primary school was established in the village in 1962, although it took several years to provide a mud structure and a teacher. Enrollment in the school remained negligible throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, but there was marked improvement in this respect from the late 1970s. At present, more than 60 per cent of the school-aged boys are attending school, five boys are matriculates, two of them are studying in college, and 12 boys are studying in high school in Dhadar and Rindli. All of them are day scholars and commute daily to school by bicycle. Apart from these, only five males are literate in the village. Female literacy is almost zero.

The principal occupation is agriculture and everyone has small landholdings. Generally, a household in the village owns a few goats, some cows, and about a dozen or so chickens. The cows and the goats are locally bred, and their milk yield is low and is entirely consumed by the household. Oxen, goats, chickens, and eggs are sold for cash.

Social Institutions

Kinship is patrilineal and all residents belong to the same patrilineage. The extended family is the predominant institution in the village, the father is the head of the family and it is his responsibility to support and to manage the family. Females are segregated from adolescence and, unlike in many other villages, women do not work in the fields or in any other agricultural

activity. Marriages are arranged by the parents. In marriage, girls are often exchanged between different families or *lab* (bride price) is paid by the grooms' family to the bride's father. The amount of *lab*, in this village, is in the range of Rs 10,000 to 15,000.

All inhabitants of the village belong to one lineage which is, by preference, endogamous. Their kinship organisation is further strengthened by endogamy and it also provides mechanisms for ventilating hostilities and procuring reconciliations among different families. There has been no incidence of violence against person or property during the past two decades. The head of the lineage, or *wadera*, who is traditionally responsible for the resolution of conflict, has never had to mediate. Minor disputes are settled by the heads of the households themselves.

Land Management

The total cultivated land in the village totals 305 acres for which perennial irrigation is available from the river Bolan. Until 1984, all the natural resources were managed under a common property regime. Ownership of the land and irrigation rights were vested in the *Jalambani* lineage but the water rights and the right to usufruct the land were only vested in adult males. Under the common property regime, the entire land was divided into two equal halves and, on alternate years, one half was cultivated and the other was left fallow. The land to be cultivated was sub-divided equally between all the adult males of the village, and the total number of such shares was 98 in 1984. Water rights were also distributed according to the share of land at this stage. Protection and maintenance of a 4 km long irrigation channel was the joint responsibility of the entire lineage. Each and every adult male was given a share, and, on the death of a shareholder, his share reverted to the community and not to his dependents who had to depend on the charity of relatives for their survival. The male child of the deceased had to wait until adulthood to claim his share in common property. An arbiter was appointed to determine when a boy had reached adulthood and was entitled to receive his share.

The village community has experienced a fundamental change in its economic structure and production relations. Common property resource management, which had been in vogue for many generations, came to an end in 1985, when the land and water resources were distributed permanently among the males. The concept of private land ownership was introduced by the village *moulvi* (religious teacher). He considered the common ownership of resources un-Islamic, because the institutional arrangements deprived females and the dependents of the deceased of usufructuary rights to the resources. The *moulvi* claimed that property in Islam must be owned by individuals and must be inherited by all the dependents and relations of the deceased according to Islamic injunctions. The *moulvi* told us that, since the early 1970s, he had been protesting about the system of common ownership and distribution of resources because it was contrary to the edicts of Islam, but only a few persons agreed with him. This attitude began to change in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s the majority approved of the *moulvi's* point of view and private ownership of land was established. In the permanent distribution of land, however, females were not given shares although male children, even infants, received shares. For this purpose two male children were considered equal to one adult male, and, thus, the total number of shares was 108 at the time of permanent settlement.

In 1985, the entire land area of 305 acres was first divided into two parts and the two main factions of the lineage agreed to take one part, allocation to be decided by lottery. The land was then divided among the shareholders in such a way that brothers and cousins took possession of adjoining plots. Water was allocated according to land and each individual share of land was allocated one *pahr*, or three hours, of water from the irrigation channel.

The traditional institutions are quite strong and effective in management and allocation of resources. Maintenance and cleanliness of the irrigation channel, four to six times a year, is the joint responsibility of all cultivators. They must participate in the periodic cleaning and maintenance of the irrigation channel. Those who cannot participate in physical work have to pay the labour costs for their share of the work. According to convention there is a penalty for the absentees, but it has never been necessary to enforce this penalty.

The village has some pasture which consists of fallow land and land not available for cultivation which has scant vegetation. There is no prohibition on grazing and seasonal migrants are allowed to graze their herds if vegetation is available. Most of these seasonal migrants buy fodder crops or staple food crops, of inferior quality, to graze their herds.

Although the village *moulvi* played a major role in bringing about private property rights over land and water, market forces also played an equally important part in the transition towards private ownership of land. In the early 1970s, vegetable cultivation was introduced into the village by some cultivators who had been exposed, in the nearby villages, to the methods of a prosperous and modern farmer. The village is in the immediate vicinity of a large estate of the Khan of Kalat which is leased out to a Hindu manager (for Rs 400,000 a year) who has been using machinery since the early 1970s. His tractors and implements are available for hire to other farmers in the area.

Vegetables proved more profitable than wheat and sorghum, the principal crops of the area, even though, at that time transportation was extremely difficult and market contacts were weak. Vegetables transported, on a camel's back, to Dhadar (8 km), and sold to the local shopkeepers, at considerably lower prices, paid more than any other staple crop at that time. However, the cultivation of vegetables was labour intensive, and, under the common property regime, every individual was awarded a different plot of land every year. Nobody was ready to work hard for someone else to cultivate the plot next year.

In the late 1970s, some cultivators from the nearby villages brought tractors and a rural road was demarcated which opened up opportunities for automobile traffic. Demarcation of the new rural road facilitated transportation of fresh vegetables to distant places. Commission agents from Quetta were attracted to cheap vegetables and the entire crop was disposed of at the farm gate without any trouble. Successful cultivators encouraged other individuals to accept permanent land settlement and the arguments of the *moulvi* were used to win support. There were substantial income differences among the farmers growing vegetables and the farmers cultivating cereal crops. In addition, many farmers were convinced that the *moulvi* was telling the truth and that he must be obeyed. According to the village *moulvi*, under the common property regime, subsistence cultivation was the norm and a large number of people avoided hard work, but it is difficult to substantiate. The *moulvi's* campaign was organised for recognition of the Islamic principal of inheritance and property rights of females. However, although the former has been established the latter is still not acceptable, because of established traditions and dominant social values.

The village has witnessed many changes in a short span of time. Land is now alienable private property which can be sold for cash, although so far only one person has sold his property. The commission agents and the road linked the village economy with the greater markets which have played a very important part in bringing about socioeconomic changes. The village economy is subject to market forces and the rates fixed by the traders in Quetta and Sukker. This has brought an important change in production relations. Previously, land was cultivated with bullocks and all the able-bodied men in the village cultivated their small plots of land by themselves. Only a few persons employed wage labour in the harvest season if the crops were

plentiful. Now the ploughing, levelling, sowing, reaping, and threshing are done by tractors and wage labour.

Land distribution in Jalambani is not skewed, although there are some differences in family landholdings. However, only a few families own more than 12 acres of land, and it is not feasible for a large number of farmers to maintain and employ bullocks. Previously there were only eight bullocks in the village and the owners received a share of the crop from farmers who employed them. The cultivation of cash crops increased the farmers' income and, in a situation of freedom from want, farmers can afford to rent tractors and wage labour. Within a few years, bullocks were completely replaced by hired tractors and other implements. Another important change in the past few years has been the employment of wage labour for most jobs. Vegetable cultivation, which a large number of cultivators have adopted, is labour intensive. Most farmers lack resources to rent tractors and pay wages at the time of sowing. The commission agents from Quetta provide loans for this purpose and these are repaid at harvest time.

Village politics are marred by factionalism. What gives this a distinctive atmosphere is interaction among kinship groups and factions which often result in coalescence of the kinship groups into a number of conflicting activities.

Project Assistance

Project intervention started in 1986 when the village organisation (VO) was first formed. At that time, the VO had 48 members because all the households in the village participated. There were probably amicable relations among factions at that time and all the heads of households were persuaded to join the village organisation. Later, however, there were some disputes in the local government elections and one faction withdrew from the VO in order to disappoint its opponents.

The faction that took over the VO is very eager to introduce development schemes - construction of rural roads, etc. - in order to impress upon the other faction that their cooperation is not necessary to implement development schemes. Because of the factional strife the VO was inactive for some time, and the Development Officer (third since the VO was organised) did not seem interested in receiving it. When the VO was re-organised in 1988, its membership dropped from 48 to 25. Apart from the factionalism, the VO is not regular in savings nor in holding meetings. The leaders, its chairman, and the secretary are influential individuals who have some connections with the low level officials in the sub-division. The secretary is a landowner, proprietor of one of the three shops in the village, and a councillor on the Mashkaf Union Council.

The other faction is led by the village *moulvi* who is influential because of his position as a religious teacher, custodian of the village mosque, and ritual leader; he is widely respected by all villagers. The *moulvi* is available in the village at all times and tries to meet all visitors to the village. He does not like the VO and, keeping a distinctively low profile, grumbles against its leaders. In these circumstances, the VO is bound to be an ineffective and unorganised body.

The Project provided assistance in some physical infrastructure schemes and four culverts were constructed over the irrigation channel to facilitate transportation. The VO demanded other physical infrastructure schemes such as drainage construction and street paving.

However, despite the many problems involved in using hired machinery and tractors, the VO has not applied for assistance in this matter. The VO has also not asked for assistance in improving

agricultural productivity, livestock and poultry breeding, land development, and water course improvement. Its vision is limited to physical infrastructure schemes which are a source of income and can be used as instruments in factional strife.

The Women's section of the project, which is engaged in health education programmes and in introducing income-generating activities for village women, has not received encouragement despite the great efforts of the project staff. In 1988, the Project started a programme to train Community Health Workers (CHW). After 17 days of intensive training workers are able to identify and treat most of the common and minor ailments and for this they are provided with the UNICEF-supplied health kit. Two persons from the village were nominated by the VO for CHW training. One of them joined after repeated calls and dropped out after a few days.

The project is an equal partner with the LGD in rural development. The DO of the LGD in the union council is the main resource person in the villages and is involved in organising the rural masses. The DO involved is interested in getting development schemes for the village, and has asked the VO leaders to raise their savings in order to get development schemes approved by the Project. He has tried to cover up the malfunctioning of the VO and maintains its records properly in his office in order to get sanction for development schemes. However, despite this, VO meetings are infrequent. The leaders claim that two meetings were held in the previous six months, whereas the DO has recorded four. VO savings are neither regular nor uniform and, in the past two years, the entire savings of Rs 4244 have been deposited in four installments only. The DO has not yet grasped the basic strategy of the Project and its objectives, and the villagers remain ill-versed in organisational matters. Popular participation, representation, self-help, and cooperation are concepts that have yet to be fully understood and internalised.

ANNEX 2: KILLI MUSA KHAN JUMMA KHAN

Introduction

Killi Musa Khan, Killi Jumma Khan, Gharibabad, and Allahabad are a cluster of villages located close to each other. They are situated 130 km from Quetta, on the Quetta-Sibi road, in the western backyard of Dhadar town. The cluster is distinctive from other rural areas of Baluchistan in many respects. The first two villages were selected for the study. The two villages are separated by a 12 ft wide street. Two blocks on one side of the street are called Killi Musa Khan and, on the other side of the street, Killi Jumma Khan. There were two separate village organisations for these blocks and our discussion is confined to these two villages. Both these blocks, Jumma Khan and Musa Khan, have been involved in the development efforts of the Project since its inception.

The climate of these villages is similar to Sibi which is very hot in summer and mild in winter. The mean minimum and mean maximum temperature of Sibi during July was 25.7° and 42.3° respectively. The mean minimum and maximum temperature in January was 6.9° and 22.3° respectively. Rainfall is scanty and varies from year to year in the range of 80 to 150 mm per annum. There is only one primary school and no basic health unit or other services.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The total number of households in Killi Musa Khan is 28 and in Killi Jumma Khan around 80. The average size of a household is from six to seven persons and the total population is under 500. All the inhabitants are *Sunni* Muslims.

Only four households are engaged in agriculture. The rest are wage labourers and work in towns for different trades. People of the Musa Khan block are *Gola Baluch*, members of the same lineage and migrants from the same area of Sanni.

Musa Khan was a cultivator working as a tenant in this area for many years. Later he obtained the land for a rent of Rs 42,000 and cultivated it with the help of three other households. In the past decade, most of the relatives of Musa Khan, who were seasonal migrants, constructed permanent huts on the land cultivated by Musa Khan. The landlord served notice through court and asked all the illegal occupants to vacate his land. Threatened by the prospect of becoming homeless, they approached the Project for assistance. The Project helped them to purchase land and to erect houses on a self-help basis.

The Killi Jumma Khan case is similar. The occupants were seasonal migrants from Dasht who had been given similar notices by the landlord. They also approached the Project and requested assistance for the purchase of land. Assistance was granted, and houses were built on a self-help basis with Project cooperation. All the households in the Jumma Khan block are labourers who work for wages in towns.

The houses are made out of a mixture of mud and hay. Roofs, in more than 70 per cent of the houses, are constructed with iron girders, T-iron, and baked tiles. Clean potable water is available from public taps. The majority of houses have very large compounds with boundary walls as high as eight feet. Several houses of the same extended family are located within one compound.

Baluchi and *Brohi* are the mother tongues of *Baluchi* and *Kurds* respectively but a large proportion of the men can also speak *Saraiki* and *Urdu*. Only a few men in the village can read and write, and the females are all illiterate. The new generation is now going to school and about 70 per cent of the school-age male children are attending school, several have passed matriculation, and one boy is a student of M.Sc. Chemistry at the University of Baluchistan. The occupational structure is, to some extent, diversified. Only four households are engaged in cultivation, a large number of persons are labourers, several are employed as peons and watchmen in government offices in Dhadar, and several are employed in the Baluchistan Levy force. Three high school graduates are working as primary school teachers.

The people of Musa Khan block have now settled permanently in the village, and no longer return to their old homes in Sanni where there is a scarcity of potable water and lack of employment opportunities for wage labour.

All the *Kurd* inhabitants of the Jumma Khan block, (53 households) are seasonal migrants from Umer Dhor in Dasht, about 50 km from Quetta. These people used to migrate to the plains in winter and before building houses on the block they used to live in tents for the six month period. They own permanent houses in Dasht, and all except a few *Kurd* households migrate to their homes in Dasht in spring and return to the Jumma Khan blocks in autumn. If the rain comes, they cultivate land in Dasht, otherwise men travel to towns in search of wage labour leaving their women and children behind.

Social Institutions

Nuclear families are more common than the joint and extended families which are now disintegrating rapidly. Urban influences and a high rate of physical mobility, due to extensive travel to find work as wage labourers, have played an important part in changing family institutions. Adolescents who travel and live independently as wage earners and enjoy more freedom tend to deny the parental controls regarding marriage. However, several households of the extended family live in the same compound and, when men travel to other areas in search of work, it is the father who is responsible for caring for the families of his sons.

In the case of marriage, the groom's consent is necessary, and females have no right either to make their own choice or disapprove of the spouse selected by their parents. Among the *Gola Baluch*, marriage is either by exchange or *lab* (bride price) is paid to the bride's father by the groom's family. Marriages are all endogamous and *lab* is often fixed under Rs 5,000. Some villagers have now begun to question the *lab* custom. *Kurds* are also endogamous and marry their boys by obtaining their consent but without giving the same option to their girls. Most of their marriages are arranged between different types of cousins and *lab* is not prevalent among them.

Musa Khan, the most prosperous man, is leader of the *Gola Baluch*. His son and partners are leaders of the entire lineage-based group, and all minor disputes are resolved by them. Jumma Khan *Kurd* is the leader of his block. He is a literate and prosperous landowner from Dasht who has also helped many of his lineage to settle in the village for which he has been acknowledged as *wadera*, headman, by all the *Kurd* households. All minor disputes are resolved by these elders and no major incident or dispute has occurred during the past decade.

Project Assistance

The Project assisted the villagers to form a village organisation in August 1986. At that time 25 households joined and members deposited Rs 100 each in a savings' fund as well as contributing Rs 10 monthly towards the savings or the self-help fund. The first task of the VO was the construction of houses on the newly acquired land, and the Project provided assistance on a self-help basis. Almost all residents built their own mud structures for which the Project paid daily wages. Twenty five per cent of the wages paid by the Project were deposited as savings in the self-help fund. The VO has become a successful village organisation and has justified its existence by solving the immediate and most pressing accommodation problem.

The VO has emerged as an intermediary for the villagers with development agencies and government departments, and it is a properly functioning organisation as far as savings and meetings are concerned. Savings were regular until February 1989 and, according to its office bearers and the LGD officials, VO meetings are held regularly. At these meetings certain requests are forwarded to the Project for approval. Leadership of the VO has not changed since its inception, and the leaders are influential members of the community because they have helped other members in the past.

The *Golas* of Musa Khan block designated Musa Khan as *takri* and *wadera* (titles for *Baluch* and *Brohi* heads of sub-clans). Musa Khan's contacts with the local officials have also confirmed his leadership of the block. He is also the only person in the block whose son is a student at Baluchistan University. This son was also secretary of the VO. The authority of Musa Khan is such that, whenever we tried to talk to other villagers, they referred us to Musa Khan or his son. It appears, therefore, that the institutional structure of *Baluch* tribal authority and hierarchy has been transplanted into the VO.

The VO has not fully succeeded in instilling the spirit of self-help and cooperation into the villagers for solving problems (individual or collective). The Project supported the VO in buying land and in house construction during the first stage. It provided construction materials and training for lavatory construction in all the houses. The project staff demonstrated lavatory construction with an understanding that the villagers would build their lavatories on a self-help basis. The lining rings for the lavatory pits were also provided but are still lying in Musa Khan's Compound. Despite repeated advice by the Project, VO members have not constructed lavatories, but at VO meetings demands for lavatories, in each individual compound, are still made.

The VO applied for an extension of the Dhadar water supply scheme to the village and the Project provided all the necessary assistance. As a result tap water is now available in the village. The VO then asked for street paving and drainage systems. Since the boundary walls of all houses are made of mud, street paving is neither necessary nor feasible as it cannot be maintained. Cemented drainage lines and brick pavements in the streets will vanish within a few months of construction, particularly as household rubbish is thrown into the streets and there is no street cleaning mechanism.

Similarly, the demand for drains in the street is unrealistic. First of all water is only available from the public taps (there are two at either end of each street). People are accustomed to using very little water because of water scarcity and carry it in pitchers and buckets, made of used motor tires, to the house at the rate of a couple of pitchers twice a day (about eight gallons). Drainage will create problems because the mud will soon clog the drainage channel and, in the absence of cleaning arrangements, turn into cesspits harbouring parasites, which will eventually vanish completely under the mud. These schemes for streeting and drainage construction were

sanctioned by the Project because of an administrative lacuna in the Project Office and a misunderstanding between the Project and the self-help wing of the LGD. The village has become an extraordinary beneficiary of the Project despite the fact that the VO has neither made any progress in achieving popular participation nor fully responded to the self-help approach to problem solving.

The VO in the Jumma Khan block was established on November 17, 1986, with 66 members. The first application for assistance was a request to the Project to pay for the land that they had already purchased. The VO claimed that, in buying land, 66 villagers obtained loans totalling 150,000 and were unable to repay their loans from their own resources because of house-building expenditures. A detailed list of 66 persons, their creditors, and the loans taken was submitted and the Project paid 60 per cent of their debts and provided assistance in house construction.

This VO is less regular in meetings or savings than the VO in the neighbouring block. Savings are deposited and meetings are held every three or four months. This is because most of the people migrate to Dasht during the summer and others work as labourers in other towns. In this block, leadership is vested in a person who is literate, prosperous, and able to establish rapport with the local officials and visitors. The Chairman of the VO is Jumma Khan Kurd.

The number of households has increased in the village since the VO was first formed in 1986, and there are about 16 new households who have applied for VO membership. This has been rejected by the VO chairman because he argues that 66 is a very large number of members, more members means more 'trouble', and, therefore, he has not allowed new residents of the village to join the VO. The trouble he is referring to is the collection of periodic savings. He claims he has to loan monthly savings to different members who are not present in the village at the time of collection. *"It is difficult to find all the 66 persons for collection of savings how can I find 80 or more for this purpose."* Leadership remains within the same group and all members have recognised the status of VO leaders as prevalent in the tribal system.

The VO has not responded to the Women's Section programmes of the Project. The Women's Section handles programmes in basic health education, embroidery training, poultry training, and fuel saving cooking stoves. The chairmen, of both VOs, said that all these schemes are useless, take too much time and effort, and have no benefits at all. *"We know well how to breed chicken and how to make stoves. We are labourers and need only labour intensive schemes where our members can be employed"*. They are very happy to be engaged in the construction of drainage and pavement of streets because all the villagers were earning wages without going out to other towns in search of work. Now the VO has applied for a village protection dam because floods cause extensive damage to the buildings. Their interest in labour intensive physical infrastructure schemes is understandable because with this all males will find work without travelling to other places. Extension of public works in the village has made a major impact on migration. In the past one year several persons from Dhadar have bought land in the vicinity of the village and have started constructing houses.

ANNEX 3: KHUMBRI

Introduction

Khumbri is situated 10 km to the north of Dhadar town. The Quetta-Sibi road passes close by this village. Khumbri is actually a valley surrounded by the Kirta mountains, located in the hottest zone of the Province where the midsummer maximum temperature often remains above 40⁰ C. Winter is mild with a minimum temperature of 7⁰ C. Rainfall is infrequent and, whenever it occurs, it brings heavy but short-lived hill-torrents into the valley. The village is a very recent settlement and is probably an excellent example of courage, determination, entrepreneurship, confidence in self-help, and collective efforts in order to control and manage natural resources and the environment. Prior to settlement, Khumbri was a barren valley with a small brackish water spring. Vegetation in winter was scanty and was used as pasture by nomads from the Dasht area.

In 1980, Dilawar Shah and his nine kinsmen bought the 12 square miles of barren mountain and the Khumbri valley owned by the *Kuchick Baluchis* of Kirta. When the land was bought it consisted of a small and highly uneven gravel bed valley with little vegetation and with a lot of salinity. According to the land classification employed by the Revenue Department, Khumbri comes under the category of *banjar ghair mumkin* (barren where cultivation is impossible). The Shah brothers bought these mountains and the valley for Rs 125,000 and their shares in this investment range from 6.25 per cent to 15.62 per cent. Very hard work was required to bring this land under the plough. A series of small and large dams are required to slow down or stop the velocity of hill torrents so that the gravel can be covered with rich alluvial soil, brought down by these same torrents, and the land levelled.

The four mile long, oval-shaped valley has one spring of water at the northern end. The valley is now divided by seven dams, two of which are almost twice as high as the rest. Because of these dams, the entire valley has been divided into eight large fields. When the hill-torrents come they are stopped by the first dam until the first field is full to the brim. When the field is filled with water, an outlet is provided and water is diverted to the next field and the same process is repeated throughout all the fields. This process allows the silt and clay in the water to settle down and after several repetitions of this process the land becomes cultivable, although the danger of salinity is always there.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The village is actually a collection of 27 hamlets scattered over the western ridge of the valley. Only one house is made of baked bricks and cement, the rest are mud structures. The people are all migrants from the Kanak Dalai area of Dasht and all except three *Brohi* households are *Sayyids* (descendants of the Prophet of Islam). All adhere to the *Sunni* sect of Islam and speak *Brohi* as their mother tongue. Most of the people can communicate in *Urdu*, *Pushto*, and *Baluchi* as well. All the inhabitants are cultivators. The total population of the village is 190; the inhabitants belong to 18 extended families, and they are divided into 32 different households. The population has grown rapidly due to the migration of eight tenant households over the past two years. The village primary school was built by the Project and most of the school-aged boys are enrolled in the school.

Social Institutions

People live in joint families. Marriages are arranged between different types of cousins and are based strictly on bride exchange. If this is not possible then some payment is made for marriage expenditure to the bride's father by the groom's family. The respondents claimed they did not pay *lab* or bride price.

Seasonal migration is a dominant phenomena in this village. Most of the inhabitants have their houses and land in Kanak. These people migrate in October to Kachhi district, in order to graze their herds on pastures and work as agricultural labourers during the harvest season. In February, after the sorghum harvest, they return to Kanak. Women, children, and some men, migrate to Kanak Dalai where the summer is more mild than in Khumbri. Most men remain in the village to keep watch on the houses, floods, and hill-torrents that may occur between May and September. Some migrate only because of the extremely hot weather and, after the village is electrified they might stop migrating in the summer.

People are migrants, but they are concerned about the future of their children because of their seasonal migration. The children go to school in Kanak where they stay for the spring and summer season. However, there is no school in Khumbri where they spend the autumn and winter seasons. Well aware of the need for continuity in the education of their children, they requested the Project for a school building and this was approved.

Land Management

In the first year only 40 acres of land were cultivated and in the following year a 100 acres. Some of the crops and saplings of 50 trees, provided by the Project, were washed away by the floods. This year about 400 acres of land are under cultivation. The uncultivated land is used as pasture. *Brohi* nomads, who throng the area during winter, are allowed to graze their herds on the uncultivated land free of charge. Last year one field of sorghum, where the crop was poor, was sold to the nomads who used the crop as fodder for their herds.

Last year wheat, pulses, sorghum, water melons, tomatoes, okra, gourds, spinach, radishes, and turnips were cultivated. Rice was cultivated on some plots but was washed away by the floods. In February, 1989, wheat, barley, beans, onions, and cumin were grown. The land is mostly irrigated by spring water but neither spring water nor the soil have been tested in a laboratory. The land has a lot of salinity in some parts. According to one respondent, 40 kg of wheat were sown per acre but the average yield was only 500 kg per acre. DAP and Urea fertilizers were also used but all these efforts failed to increase the land productivity.

Vegetables are sold through the commission agents in Quetta. Vegetables are packed in used tea chests and these are transported by farmers to Dhadar where they are handed over to the forwarding agent. The forwarding agent charges Rs 10 per package as transportation costs. The commission agent deducts six per cent commission in addition to two rupees per item as handling charges. In the current season, during January 1989, the farmers received Rs 150 per 25kg package of tomatoes and, in February 1989, they received Rs 70 for the same package. Wheat, sorghum, beans, and pulses are sold to grain traders in Dhadar.

Although most members of the consortium were pastoral nomads, with limited engagement in settled agriculture, their knowledge of crops, cultivation seasons, and methods is extensive and commendable. They are enterprising and innovative farmers who experiment with different crops. This year cumin was cultivated and a good crop was produced. If this experiment succeeds

more spices will be cultivated. An important factor is that large investments in land are required and villagers are making use of every opportunity to increase their capital. The consortium of shareholders owns all the natural resources in the valley. Although they belong to the same clan, they have also formed some sort of joint stock company which is responsible for harnessing the potential management and better utilisation of the natural resources.

Project Assistance

Construction of several huge and lengthy dams was a difficult and very expensive labour intensive task. Villagers approached the agriculture and land reclamation departments for assistance but were disappointed. The villagers then approached the Project and requested assistance. They were advised to form a village organisation (VO) representing all the villagers. The VO was formed in August 1986 with 25 members; all of whom deposited Rs 100 each to establish a savings' fund. The Project provided a bulldozer for 500 hours to construct two large dams. The consortium employed its own resources and bought two tractors to complete five other smaller dams. In a short span of time, 400 acres of land were brought under cultivation. This area is expected to increase very rapidly because of the efforts employed by the consortium.

The VO in Khumbri can function only in the winter months when all the inhabitants return from their summer abode at Kanak. VO meetings are held only in these months and savings are collected and deposited at an interval of two to four months. The VO had a total savings' fund of Rs 24,308 in February 1989, but has not succeeded in creating broad-based cooperation in different activities. It seems to have been organised only to obtain assistance from the Project. In all other activities, the consortium owning the valley has organised its joint ventures in an appreciable and efficient manner.

In 1985, the consortium bought a second-hand tractor, (with a trolley and all implements) which was badly needed for development of land and cultivation in the valley. The tractor is also rented to the farmers from the nearby villages. When it is not required for agricultural purposes it is made available for hire and is employed in the transportation of sand, gravel, and bricks. Although members of the consortium did not disclose the exact profit, they agreed that the tractor had proved to be a good investment. This was possible because the tractor is driven and maintained by the members of the consortium. The consortium is enterprising and pursues every avenue to raise capital. In 1987 they bought another used tractor, and with these two tractors they are rapidly developing their land and earning income to invest in the development of land and water resources.

ANNEX 4: GOLA BASTI

Introduction

Gola Basti in Jalal Khan Union Council of Kachhi district, is 280 km east of Quetta and 10km from both the metalled road and Bhag town. The village is in an alluvial plain in the eastern area of Lahri mountains and is located in the hottest zone of Baluchistan where the midsummer temperature often reaches 40°C, although the winter is mild and pleasant.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The present population of the village is 227 distributed throughout 43 households. Agriculture is the main occupation. About 50 per cent of the school-aged boys are enrolled in the primary school. *Saraiki* is the native language, while *Sindhi* and *Baluchi* are extensively spoken and some people can also communicate in the *Brohi* language. All the people are ethnically *Gola Baluch* and adhere to the *Sunni* sect of Islam. Agriculture is the main occupation.

The village is a new settlement about a quarter of a mile away from the site of an older settlement which was washed away in the 1986 floods. The village mosque and the primary school survived the devastating floods and still stand on the old site. All houses are mud structures. Most have only one room and some are still without proper plaster on the walls and floors. All houses have thatched roofs supported by wooden beams. None of the houses have separate kitchen, bathroom, or lavatory.

There is no shop in the village. The nearest shops are in Jalal Khan village about three km away. The villagers do all their shopping in Bhag town ten km away because, in their opinion, shops in Jalal Khan are very expensive. They travel by a bus which passes through the village on alternate days. For shopping needs, they usually take 30-40 km of grain, mostly sorghum or oil seeds, sell it to the grain dealers for cash and with this buy commodities. They buy clothing, most grocery items, kerosene oil for lamps, tobacco, and all other consumer items not produced locally. Most of the villagers grow varieties of gourd, spinach, turnips, radishes, and okra for their own consumption and they also share them with those who do not grow their own.

Social Institutions

Joint families are the norm. Women are actively engaged in agricultural and livestock activities. Marriages are arranged by the parents among close relatives to maintain group solidarity and power. Normally, girls are exchanged in marriage and if this is not possible a small amount (usually under Rs 5,000), known as *lab*, is paid as the bride price. The institutions have not changed much.

The social organisation of the village is composed of different *thala* or labour groups. A labour group is a collection of several households of brothers and cousins who work together as members of the agricultural production team. Some labour groups also include members who are not related by blood or marriage. The labour group is a necessity that has been imposed by the organisation of production and management of resources. Every *thala* is headed by a headman, known as a *raiece*, who is often the most influential landowner in the village. The

raiece settles the individual problems and minor disputes which occur in their day to day life. There are eight such *thalas* in this village.

Land Management

The entire area of land was owned by the chiefs of the *Mugheri Baluch* tribe, the largest landlords in the area. Since the mid 1980s, small plots of land have been sold to the tenants, but distribution of the land is uneven. The headman owns about 200 acres whereas most of the households own less than 10 acres. Their holdings are much below subsistence level and due to the uncertainty of irrigation they cannot even partly depend on their own land for their livelihood. Therefore, the entire village is a tenant village where the inhabitants cultivate the land of other landlords on a crop-sharing basis.

The land is given for cultivation by the landlords not to individual tenants but to the head of the *thala* who is responsible for preparation of the land, maintenance of embankments, the irrigation canal, small diversion dams, and irrigation operation and cultivation of crops. On an average, a *thala* manages about 200 acres of land. Work required on this amount of land is beyond the capacity of six or seven men and their bullocks. Only part of the land can be prepared for irrigation and cultivation by the *thala* due to many constraints.

Water for irrigation is uncertain and dependent upon rainfall in the catchment area. The water comes in the form of high velocity hill-torrents which are diverted into inundation canals for irrigation of land. Individual fields of several acres are surrounded by a strong embankment. Maintenance of embankments to prevent leakage at the time of irrigation, diversion of irrigation water at the time of destruction of dams, and other such activities require group efforts.

The landlord receives one third of the grain and one tenth of the hay and fodder. All inputs and labour are provided by the tenants. The carpenter also works under a traditional contract arrangement where he receives one thirtieth of the harvest for his services.

Sorghum is the principal crop of the area and is dependant upon the floods in May/June. In the absence of floods, farmers have to irrigate this crop. Another significant crop is water melon which is also flood-irrigated in January/February. This crop is profitable since it is marketed in distant towns and cities. Fodder and vegetable crops are also grown in this area.

The village has no specific pastureland. All the uncultivated land, which brings some sort of vegetation after the winter rains or after the summer floods, and the cultivated fields after harvest, are used as pastures. Usually women and children take the animals out to graze. During some months a few villagers take sheep, goats, and cows from the whole village for grazing. Although no fixed wages are paid for this service, the shepherd is paid whatever the villagers can afford. From November to February, *Brohi* nomads from the highlands of Kalat come to the area with their flocks of sheep and goats. They are free to graze their herds on the uncultivated land. After harvest, the stalk and residue of the sorghum is sometimes sold to these nomads for their herds.

The Project Assistance

Project intervention started in 1986 when the villagers requested the construction of a village protection dam. The villagers were advised to form a VO. Each household became a member of the VO and deposited an establishment fund with the Development Officer. The Project agreed to finance and implement the village protection dam on the condition that local resources and labour would be utilised to the maximum extent.

Villagers were encouraged to use their bullocks, and were paid daily wages at the rate of Rs 30 per day out of which 25 per cent was deposited as compulsory savings in the VO bank account. There were only seven pairs of bullocks at that time in the village. The Project gave a loan to purchase 15 pairs of bullocks. After completion of the dam, the VO paid for the bullocks from its savings. One pair of bullocks was given to the village headman, as traditional tribute, and the remaining 42 oxen were distributed, one ox to each VO member. Every VO member purchased another ox and each became owner of a pair of bullocks from the wages earned from the dam construction. The villagers were very pleased with the arrangement because their homes were now protected against the floods; they owned oxen; they earned wages which they badly needed because of the drought that year; and they had saved a substantial amount in their joint savings' account.

After the completion of the dam, the VO applied for the construction of a lined water tank. This was needed, because the old unlined water tank was dirty and polluted. It also used to dry up before the arrival of the floods. In the absence of water, people were forced to migrate to some other area for a few months or they had to bring water from very long distances. The Project approved the scheme for construction of the lined water tank and the tank was constructed on a self-help basis. This new tank is protected by a boundary wall and water is drawn by a hand pump outside the boundary wall. The VO is responsible for maintenance and authorises its use to outsiders. Now the village has two water tanks; one relatively clean and hygienic for the men and another, the old one, for the animals.

The third intervention of the project was in extending a loan to purchase sorghum seeds. Generally, a *baniya* (money lender-cum-shopkeeper) provides seeds on loan and charges interest at the rate of 10 per cent per month plus a surcharge of one month's interest. This problem was discussed by the VO and a request was made for internal lending (from the savings of the VO). The project loaned money and the money was recovered with an interest rate of only 10 per cent.

The success of the VO was due to several factors. Firstly, the village is almost homogeneous as far as the economic conditions of a vast majority of the people are concerned. All, except the village headman, are small landholders-cum-tenants. All are extremely hard working and enterprising farmers eager to take risks and respond to innovations. Secondly, the institution of *thala*, under which the head of the group is responsible for his members, allocates responsibility to a limited number of persons. Finally, the traditions and conventions of the tribal system, under which one must fulfill one's obligations and the trust put in one, are also responsible for the success of this institutional innovation. The traditional tribal system, in which the leadership of various sized groups and lineages is vested in the *takris*, *waderas*, and *raiece*, is very deeply rooted in the social organisation.

The women have not yet formed a Women's Organisation. However, the benefits of the VO have become so obvious to the villagers that, after a short span of time, they will realise the need of a Women's Organisation and allow their women to form one. Much hard work is required on the part of the Project to organise women and engage them in income generating schemes.

The villagers lack a basic knowledge of health and hygiene. There is no dispensary or basic health unit in the village or in any other village nearby, except the government hospital at Bhag. Representatives of other government departments or other development agencies have never visited the village and the villagers have not approached them. The agriculture and animal husbandry departments have some field staff in the area but they have never been seen by the villagers. No other international agency, engaged in development activities in Baluchistan, has a project in this village, and hence there is much scope for the Pak/German Self-help Project here.

ANNEX 5: PINDRAN

Introduction

Pindran Village is located in Nichara Union Council in Kalat District 230 km south of Quetta. Pindran Valley is about 2000masl and is surrounded by lofty and mostly barren mountains with scarce vegetation and very few trees. The valley is located in the temperate zone of Baluchistan where mid-winter minimum temperatures remain below freezing point and the summer are mild. The climatic conditions of Pindran are similar to those of Kalat which is 60 km from the valley. The mean minimum and mean maximum temperature of Kalat during the mid-winter of 1985 were recorded as -10°C and 9.4°C respectively. The mean minimum and mean maximum mid-summer temperatures for the same year were 16.70° and 31.1°C respectively.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The total population of the village is estimated to be 880. According to the census of 1961, the population of the village was 405, distributed throughout 90 households. In 1972, the total population was 716 and the number of households was 127. By 1981, the population of the village was recorded as 1,469 and the number of households was 240 (Government of Pakistan n.d, V-70; Government of Pakistan 1976, 148; and Government of Pakistan 1983). At present, according to the estimates of the DO, the population is around 1900 and the number of households 280.

The village is a relatively old settlement. Fruit and vegetable production for the market was introduced in 1972 and a rural road connecting the village with the district headquarters was completed in 1976.

Until the recent past, raising sheep and goats was the occupation of a large number of non-farm households who used to migrate to Kachhi district in winter to feed their herds. At present, only a small number of households migrate in the winter and they return to their homes in spring. Most of these seasonal migrants own relatively large flocks, without any agricultural land in the village. Cultivation is the principal occupation of the village and accounts for the activities of 50 per cent of the households. Landless labourers and artisans constitute 17 per cent of the households. There were 12 shopkeepers, ten religious teachers, 20 government employees, and four of the villagers were working in the Persian Gulf States.

Most of the houses are made of mud with thatched roofs, consisting of three rooms which are also shared by the animals. Only a few rich families have large double storey houses.

The village primary school, established in 1953, was upgraded to middle level in 1986. Total enrollment in the school was 49 students with only one student in class eight and two in class seven. The enrollment ratio is low and the drop out ratio is high. There are only two teachers in the middle school. In addition, there are two religious schools of different sub-sectarian groups in the village. Enrollment in one of the two religious schools was reported as 115 and it is difficult to confirm this claim. Most of the religious schools in the country report larger enrollment figures to obtain larger grants from public funds and private charities. The impact of these three schools is reflected in the literacy ratio of 8.1 per cent reported in the census of 1981.

There are 12 shops in the village which provide people with household articles and groceries, and most of the people still exchange foodgrains for their necessities. There are two water mills for grinding flour. The owner of each mill receives one tenth of the grains ground as wages.

Another mechanical flour mill was also installed a few years ago and the rate for grinding is Rs 10 per 40 kg. Most of the population is engaged in agriculture combined with herding, and wage labour is an additional source of income. The labourers migrate to Mekran or Quetta in search of work. Wages are highest in Mekran, at the rate of Rs 50 per day, so during winter most of the labourers go to Mekran, which is in the tropical zone, and during summer they work in Quetta which is in the temperate zone. There is one basic health unit in the village, and the building was constructed in 1978. The unit is staffed by one dispenser and a trained midwife.

Social Institutions

Ethnically, the entire population is *Brohi* speaking and belongs to about two dozen lineages of different tribes. All of them belong to the *Sunni* Sect of Islam but are further sub-divided into two sub-sects of the Deobandis and the Barelvis.

Families are patrilineal and domiciled in extended family groups. Marriages are usually arranged between members of the same clan and *lab* or bride price is paid so that girls cannot be exchanged in marriage. Kinship is a strong institution and groups are organised around kin loyalties and obligations. During different ceremonies and rites of passage, gifts are exchanged among the kin group as well as among affinal relatives. Solidarity of the kin group is the main feature of social life where such a large number of small groups of different lineages live together.

Social organisation is tribal, where chiefs and leaders of different lineages are recognised as *motaber* or 'local influentials' whose authority extends to their own lineages and those of their economically dependent tenants and allies. The *Pindrani* tribal chief used to be the most powerful person, because of his economic power and the number of his followers. After his death, the 'local influentials' played an increasingly important part in settlement of disputes. Religious leaders, such as the *mullas* and *sayyids*, who until the recent past, were almost at the lowest rung of the hierarchy, now play a major part in the settlement of petty disputes. (In the past, only prominent religious men were invited to the *Jirga* or tribal council). The disintegration of the tribal system and proliferation of religious schools, to some extent, created a religious elite in *Baluchi-Brohi* tribal society.

The village leadership now consists of mainly the *Pindrani* and the *Nichari* clans who are the largest clans in the village. A large number of other lineages are tenants who were mainly allowed to settle in the village for cultivation of land on a crop-sharing tenancy basis.

The social structure of the village can be analysed in terms of four economic and occupation groups. The first group is that of the large landlords who own orchards and vegetable plantations that are cultivated by landless labourers. Their economic power in the village is strengthened because of their authority over the large kinship group. The next group is one of small landowners who combine cultivation with sheep-goat raising. They are not economically dependent on the large landlords but the kinship networks and political alliances make them appendages to one or other of the powerful clans. The third group consists of tenants, artisans, and landless labourers; employed by large landowners. The fourth group, which is not separate from the third group, is composed of the herdsmen who graze their own sheep and goats, as well as those of other people, either on the basis of monthly wages per animal or mostly on a yearly contract basis.

Village politics are strictly factional between the *Pindrani* and the *Nichari*, and they are severely alienated from each other. The lineage leaders compete for resources from the Government and

this, in 1983, resulted in a big fight between two tribal groups in which one person was killed. The settlement of this dispute was sought, through the indigenous institution of the tribal council, and the case was resolved by compensating the aggrieved group with money, land, and two girls in marriage. The cash settlement, according to some villagers, was Rs 500,000 and 20 per cent of this money was given to the tribal chief as traditional tribute. One of the mountains previously owned by the *Nichari* was also taken over by the *Pindrani* tribe. This mountain was declared open to all members of the *Pindrani* tribe while its trees and wood became the property of the tribal chief.

Land Management

The total land area of the village is 400 acres and all the land is irrigated with perennial water from a spring two kilometres away in the mountains. The water is distributed according to the traditional rights of usufruct vested in different lineages and their landlords. Distribution follows an eight day cycle. Water is distributed into five unequal shares every 24 hours. One share lasts nine hours, one four hours, and three are of three hours duration. Water rights are predetermined. However, timings are on the basis of rote. A water manager, or *mir-i-aab*, is appointed to ensure proper distribution and he is paid by the water users. The water manager is responsible for cleaning the watercourse every four months. He fixes the responsibilities of different shareholders, and those who cannot contribute labour are obliged to pay wages for their part of the work. The water manager is also empowered to levy fines on those deliberately avoiding labour. He is also a landowner and is allowed to irrigate his land free of cost without being subject to payment of customary dues or labour in water course management and cleaning.

Irrigation water is an available commodity in the village because some landowners only possess small plots of land and their share of water is larger than their needs. These landowners sell their water to landowners who have large landholdings but insufficient water for proper irrigation. Normally water is not sold for cash but rather the water rights' owner is compensated with one fourth of the yield. Recently (1983), the Agricultural Department provided funds for improving the water channel and a farm water management committee was appointed to look after the water distribution and water rights. However, the traditional institution of *mir-i-aab* is so strong that this committee ceased to exist after completion of the work.

We were unable to obtain the correct land distribution statistics from the revenue records. Land distribution is uneven among different lineages and among different landowners of the same lineage. Large landholdings are cultivated on the basis of crop sharing tenancy for staple food crops. Orchards and vegetables are mostly cultivated by wage labour that is either employed for the whole year, at a monthly wage rate, or on a monthly basis in peak seasons. The traditional organisation of production, in which artisans used to provide services in return for a share in agricultural produce at harvest time, has been abandoned and replaced by cash payments. Land is also leased for cash on a yearly basis.

There is no tractor or any other kind of modern agricultural machinery in the village. Cultivation is done with draught animals, mainly oxen and camels. Wheat is the principal crop and it is cultivated in November and harvested in June. Sorghum and rice are also cultivated by some landowners. There are some fruit orchards with apple trees. Mulberry trees grow wild and the fruit is used as food by poor people in both fresh and dry form. Most temperate and tropical vegetables are grown and marketed in Kalat.

Forest

According to the local people, long ago the mountains were covered with Juniper (*Juniperus excelsa*), Pistachio (*Pistacia Cabulica*), and Olive (*Olea cuspidata*) trees, although this is difficult to confirm because nobody knows how long the forest has existed. At present, landlords in the area claim ownership of the mountains. During the Kalat State period, the ruler of the area was recognised as the owner of all the pastureland and agricultural land. However, at present, there is sparse vegetation and very little trees on these mountains.

The tribal chiefs, who own these resources, are also empowered to enforce sanctions on their unauthorised use. Since raising small ruminants was one of the major occupations of the tribesmen in the area, private ownership, claimed by the tribal chiefs, has restricted the use of pastureland and some of it is now closed. These mountains are also used as hunting grounds for senior government officials or for the Khan of Kalat - the previous landlord of the area. Grazing, wood cutting, and collection of dead wood from mountain areas, claimed as private property by the landlords, is totally prohibited.

Unauthorised wood cutting results in a very large fine and this is collected by the tribal chief. Unauthorised use by any person invokes sanctions which are much larger than the benefits acquired by the user. For grazing during the closure period, the penalty is one lamb. This is slaughtered and its meat distributed among the members present.

Only during drought, when people face extreme hardships in grazing their small herds of sheep and goats, does the tribal chief allow grazing for a limited period. Mountains outside this reserved area are free for grazing, hunting, and wood cutting by all inhabitants of the village. Neither forests nor vegetation are plentiful on these mountains.

Project Assistance

Because of factional struggles in the village and its large size, the Project permitted the formation of more than one VO. Two VOs, Pindran Nichari and Pindran Ramdanzai, were organised in October and November 1987 respectively. The Nichari VO was organised with 22 members only, although the households of that clan are in the majority. The VO was neither regular in savings nor in meetings, and one reason for this was the seasonal migration of some members to other areas. The DO, however, made efforts to ensure regular savings and these amounted to Rs 4,850 by the end of March, 1989. The Project approved of a flood protection dam for the VO at an estimated cost of Rs 120,000. The work is in progress, but the VO has neither tried to increase membership nor intends to do so. They have probably not understood the project philosophy and approach, as several reports of project staff who visited the village indicate.

The Ramdanzai VO was established with 23 members. The leadership and membership have not changed since its inception. Some of these people also migrate in winter to other areas and, therefore, the savings and meetings have not been regular. The Project approved a road construction scheme for the village in 1987. A scheme for a village protection dam was approved in 1988 and this is still being completed. The estimated cost is Rs 624,440. The total savings of the VO until October 1988 were Rs 4730. Savings in March 1989 were Rs 25,064, because the VO members working on the dam received wages and 25 per cent of the wages go into the VO's saving account.

ANNEX 6: TALHAR PATHAN

Introduction

Talhar Pathan is located approximately 400 km from Quetta, in the Jalal Khan Union Council of Kachhi District. It is situated at a distance of 15 km to the west of Bhag and 5 km from union council headquarters.

Demographic Characteristics and Village Profile

The total estimated population of the village was 318 persons distributed among 49 households, in comparison to a population of only 31 in 1981. Most of the people migrated from the village to other areas during the mid-1950s when Bolan dam was built, because it diverted flood waters into the reservoir and distributed within its own vicinity. The village inhabitants, migrated to other areas where water was available. Such a massive increase in population, between 1981 and 1989, was due to the fact that in 1985 the Jalal Khan Dam was constructed and it diverted the flood water to this massive plain; resulting in an influx of people who returned to this area to cultivate the land of their former landlords. Seasonal migration is only induced by shortage of drinking water (mostly from April until the arrival of fresh floods). A large number of *Brohi* nomads, from Kalat district, come to the area during winter to graze their animals and work as agricultural labour during the harvest season.

Sindhi, *Saraiki*, and *Baluchi* are common languages and some people can also communicate in *Brohi* and *Urdu*. Almost all inhabitants are illiterate. All the inhabitants belong to the *Sunni* sect of Islam. Agriculture is the principal occupation of inhabitants in the area.

Social Organisation and Land Management

Ethnically the people are *Baluch*, mostly migrants from the Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan districts, who were brought to the area as farmers during the past two centuries.

The social organisation and land management is similar to that of Gola Basti. Out of the 49 households in the village only two are landlords and all others are tenants. There are no social or economic differences among the tenants, all of whom cultivate the land of a handful of landlords.

The system of joint tenant cultivation, as described in Gola Basti, is prevalent. There are altogether five *thalas* in the village. All the members of the joint tenant group owe allegiance to their *raiece* who is responsible for his group to outsiders and resolves their mutual disputes if any. All except two groups of tenants are members of the same extended families. Therefore, kinship, apart from the labour group, also provides a basis for group solidarity.

Project Assistance

Project intervention in the area started from the Orientation Phase, and the Jalal Khan Dam was the first scheme implemented by the Project in 1984-1985. The VO was formed in August 1986, and the first scheme identified by the VO was a school building. The Project approved of the scheme and the building was completed in 1987. This school is the most modern building in the

village. The school enrollment is, however, low, largely due to the involvement of children in agriculture.

An interesting incident occurred in 1988 when the school building was occupied by the son of a *Buledi* landlord and the villagers were unable to ask him to vacate the building. He was, however, told to do so, but he failed to comply. The matter was reported to the Project and a complaint was lodged with the district administration. The occupants were forcibly removed by the police and arrested. The landlord was very angry with the villagers and they had to pay the price for ejecting his son from the school building.

The villagers have bought some land from the landlord but the title has not been transferred to them despite payment of Rs 75,000 by several *thalas* for purchase of small plots of land to individual tenants. The landlord blatantly refused to transfer the land and asked the villagers to pay a Rs 50,000 fine for the arrest of his son. He deducted Rs 50,000 from the money that he had already received and the villagers were unable to do anything about it. When the head of the *thala* was informing us about this incident, a member of the landlord's family came along, and the tenant was unable to utter a word in his presence.

The VO is a properly functioning organisation and holds regular meetings. Its savings amount to Rs 24,870. The Project provided the VO with a lined water tank for drinking water supply and this solved the water shortage problem. Loans from money lenders are a problem for the villagers, and, in 1989, their VO savings will be used for internal lending. The people have understood the project objectives and approach and are willing to cooperate to improve their socioeconomic conditions.

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